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For more than three years, the United States Con-
gress has considered legislation dictating that the United
States take certain actions in the World Bank and other
multilateral development banks which, opponents have
argued, would be incompatible both with United States
obligations as a member of these banks and with the apoli-
tical character and development goals of the banks. These
actions include earmarking United States contributions to
the banks away from particular countries and projects,
requiring members of the banks' boards of directors to
oppose all loans for such countries and projects, and re-
quiring these directors to oppose loans to countries with
records of human rights violations. Some of these con-
gressional demands have been motivated, at least in part,
by genuine concern over violations of human rights in
countries receiving assistance from the banks.l Other
motives, however, include the desire of various members
of Congress to increase congressional control over foreign
policy and particularly over United States foreign assis-
tance; 2 to reduce United States foreign assistance,3 especi-
t B.A. Swarthmore College, 1975; J.D. Harvard Law School 1980;
member, Massachusetts, Minnesota and New York Bars.
1. See 121 Cong. Rec. H12053 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1975) (amend-
ment offered by Rep. Harkin); 123 Cong. Rec. H3121-28 (daily ed. Apr.
6, 1977) (amendment offered by Rep. Badillo); see also Harkin, Human
Rights and Foreign Aid, in Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy 15,
19-21 (P. Brown & D. MacLean eds. 1979).
2. See Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations
for 1979, Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations
of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 637-38 (1978)
(statement by Ralph A. Dungan, U.S. Executive Director, Inter-American
Development Bank 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 House Hearings];
Balmer, The Use of Conditions in Foreign Relations Legislation, 7
Denver J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 197, 199 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Baimer];
Weisbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and United States Foreign Policy,
7 (Supplement) Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 231, 238-40 (1977). See also
sources cited at note 1 supra and note 5 infra.
3. Balmer, supra note 2, at 207-09.
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ally foreign assistance provided through the multilateral
development banks; 4 and to eliminate any connection be-
tween United States funds and the assistance which banks
provide to countries and types of projects opposed by
certain members of Congress.5
This Article discusses the conflict between demands
for such actions and the charters of the multilateral
development banks, which declare that the decisions of the
banks must be based solely on economic considerations and
must be guided by the strictly development-related pur-
poses of the banks. Specifically, the Article will exam-
ine the validity of the legislation and government poli-
cies generated by congressional demands for human rights
criteria for multilateral banks' decisions. It will also
examine the banks' charters and the rights and obligations
4. See 125 Cong. Rec. H6137-45 (cuts in appropriations for
Inter-American Development Bank), H6146-47 (cuts in appropriations for
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), H6148-54 (cuts
in appropriations for International Development Association), H6166-67
(cuts in appropriations for Asian Development Bank) (all in daily ed.
July 18, 1979). See also [1977] Cong. Q. Almanac 286; [1978] Cong. Q.
Almanac 123; [1979] Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 1912, 2340, 2788 (comparison
of cuts in bilateral aid appropriations with cuts in multilateral aid
appropriations).
5. 125 Cong. Rec. H6157-65 (daily ed. July 18, 1979), H7293-
7300, H7301-02 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979); 124 Cong. Rec. H2491 (daily
ed. Apr. 5, 1978) (remarks by Rep. Young), H8555-58, H8563 (daily ed.
Aug. 14, 1978); 123 Cong. Rec. H6346-51 %daily ed. June 22, 1977),
H6385-88, H6421-22 (daily ed. June 23, 1977).
6. Articles ot Agreement of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, multilateral, 60 Stat.
1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, as amended Dec. 16, 1965, 16
U.S.T. 1942, T.I.A.S. No. 5929 [hereinafter cited as I.B.R.D.].
Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation,
May 25, 1955, multilateral, 7 U.S.T. 2197, T.I.A.S. No. 3620, 264
U.N.T.S. 117, as amended Sept. 1, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 2945, T.I.A.S. No.
4894, Aug. 25, 1965, 24 U.S.T. 1760, T.I.A.S. No. 7683 [hereinafter
cited as I.F.C.].
Articles of Agreement of the International Development
Association, Jan. 26, 1960, multilateral, 11 U.S.T. 2284, T.I.A.S. 'Not
4607, 439 U.N.T.S. 249 [hereinafter cited as I.D.A.].
Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank,
Apr. 8, 1959, multilateral, 10 U.S.T. 3029, T.I.A.S. No. 4397, 389
U.N.T.S. 69, as amended, Jan. 28, 1964, 21 U.S.T. 1570, T.I.A.S. No.
6920, Mar. 31, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7381, T.I.A.S. No. 6591, Mar. 23, 1972,
23 U.S.T. 2455, T.I.A.S. No. 7437, June 1, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 3547,
T.I.A.S. No. 8383 [hereinafter cited as I.A.D.B.].
Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank, Dec. 4, 1965,
multilateral, 17 U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6103, 571 U.N.T.S. 123, as




of the United States as a member of several of the multi-
lateral banks. At a more general level, this Article is
concerned with the validity of attempts by any member of
the banks to use its participation in the banks to further
its own political goals at the expense of the banks'
development goals. Thus, the analysis of the recent con-
gressional demands and the resulting United States actions
in the banks is intended to define more clearly the limits
to which countries may seek to advance their divergent
political objectives through the banks.
This Article will analyze, in the order listed above,
the actions demanded by members of Congress. Initially,
however, the essay will briefly examine the operations of
the multilateral development banks and why, in order to
achieve their development objectives, they must function
as apolitically as possible.
I. Apolitical Standards for Multilateral Development
Banks
Multilateral banks promote development in two
principal ways. First, they mobilize private capital for
development loans by selling their own securities on in-
ternational capital markets.7 The banks loan the proceeds
from these sales to finance development projects in devel-
oping member countries. 8 Loans of this type are called
"hard" loans because the interest rates are determined by
the rates at which the banks can borrow on international
capital markets. 9  Capital subscriptions by the governments
6. (Continued)
Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank, Aug. 4,
1963, (African states only), 510 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as
Af.D.B. ].
Agreement Establishing the African Development Fund, Nov. 29,
1972, 28 U.S.T. 4547, T.I.A.S. No. 8605, _ U.N.T.S. [herein-
after cited as Af.D.F.].
7. The World Bank Group, Policies and Operations 29 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Policies and Operations].
8. The World Bank, Questions and Answers 15 (1976).
9. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. III, §4(iv); I.F.C.,
art. III, §3(v); I.A.D.B., art. III, §7(iv); A.D.B., art. 14, para.
(vii); Af.D.B. art. 18, §3(a). For the criteria which the World Bank
uses to set interest rates, see Policies and Operations, supra note 7,
at 50-51. Interest rates on loans made recently by the World Bank
have ranged from seven to eight percent. World Bank, 1979 Annual Report
142, 186-90 [hereinafter cited as 1979 Annual Report].
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of member countries serve mainly as collateral for the
sale of these securities.1 0 Second, each of the banks
10. A small portion of capital subscriptions can be included
in the funds that are lent as hard loans. This portion is known as
the "paid in" portion of capital subscriptions. It constitutes the
portion of capital subscriptions that members must actually pay into
the banks as they subscribe to capital. Members continue to hold the
remaining portion, which serves only as collateral. This portion is
known as "callable capital." The total amount of outstanding loans
may not exceed total capital subscriptions plus reserves and surplus.
So far, none of the banks has ever had to make calls upon callable
capital, If large defaults on bank loans ever forced one of the
banks to make such a call, its -members would be required to contri-
bute pro-rata from their holdings of callable capital. See note 6,
supra: I;B.R.D,, art, II, §5, art, III, §3 art. IV, Sl(a); I.A.D.B.,
art. I, §§2(b), 4, art, TI, 9§4, 5(); A.D.B., art. 4, para. 2; art.
6, paras. 1,6; art. 11; art. 12, para. 1. See aZso 1978 House Hear-
ings., supra note 2, at 417, 694, 927; Foreign Assistance and ReZated
Programs Appropriations for 2980, Part 6; Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Foreign Operations of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55, 349 (179) [hereinafter cited as 2979 House
Hearings].
The paid in portion of capital subscriptions has been steadily
decreasing since the founding of the banks. The charters specified
the portion of original members' initial capital subscriptions that
had to he paid in. In the case of the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (I.B.R.D.), this amount was twenty percent.
The boards of governors of the banks, see text accompanying note 58,
infra, have determined what portion of subsequent increases in the
banks' capital stock must be paid in. In 1975, 1976, and 1977 the
board of governors of the Inter-American Development Bank (I.A.D.B.),
Asian Development Bank (A.D.B.), and I.B.R.D., respectively, approved
resolutions calling for capital increases that would sustain the
lending activities of these banks until the end of the 1970s. These
resolutions called for approximately ten percent of the increase in
capital subscriptions to be paid in. In 1978, 1979, and 1980, the
boards of governors of these banks passed similar resolutions calling
for new capital increases to maintain lending activities into the
early 1980s. The A.D.B. resolution again requires ten percent of the
new increases in capital subscriptions to be paid in, However, the
I.B.R.D. and I.A.D.B. resolutions require that only 7.5 percent of the
new increases be paid in. See 2979 House Hearings 115 (I.B.R.D. 1977
increase), 240 (A.D.B. 1976 increase), 291-92, 302 (IA.D,B. 1975 and
1978 increases); statement by Russell Munk, Assistant General Counsel,
United States Treasury Department, Dec. 15, 1980 (1980 I.B.R.D. and
A.D.B. increases), In 1980, the US. Congress authorized U.S. parti-
cipation in the I.A.D.B. and A.D,B. only at lower levels than those
agreed upon by the boards of governors of those institutions. Pub. L.
TVOL.6
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has a special "soft loan" facility to provide "credits"
to finance development projects in the poorest of the
developing countries. These credits bear only a low ser-
vice charge and have long maturity and grace periods.1 1
Most of the financing for these credits comes from direct
contributions, usually referred to as "share subscrip-
tions," to the soft loan facilities by the governments of
the member countries.1 2 In this Article, contributions to
the resources of both hard and soft loan facilities will
be referred to as "subscriptions."
The United States is a member of six multilateral
development institutions, 1 3 including the three institu-
tions which comprise the World Bank:
C1) the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development CI.B.R.D.)--the hard loan
facility of the World Bank,
(2) the International Development Association
(I.D.A.)--the soft loan facility of the World
Bank, and
C3) the International Finance Corporation (I.F.C.)
--the soft loan facility of the World Bank
designed to make equity investments and to pro-
vide loans to help private entrepreneurs in
developing countries.14
10,(Continued)
No. 96-259 (1980). The authorization request for the latest I.B.R.D.
increase had not been presented to Congress by the end of 1980.
See [19791 Cong. Q. Alumnac 159; 11980] Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 1397-98,
3452, 3678.
11. See note 6 supra: I.D.A., art. V, §2(b); I.A.D.B., art.
IV, §1; A.D.B., art. 19; Af.D.F., art. 16, para. 2. Credits by the
soft loan facility of the World Bank bear an annual service charge of
3/4 of one percent and usually have ten year grace periods and forty
year maturity periods. 1979 Annual Report, supra note 10, at 191-94.
See also Policies and Operations, supra note 7, at 51.
12. See note 6 supra: I.D.A., art. II, §2, art. V, §2; I.A.D.B.,
art. IV, §§3, 4; A.D.B., arts. 19, 20; Af.D.F., arts. 5-9, 14. See
Policies and Operations, supra note 7, at 35-41.
13. For a brief description of these institutions, see 2979 House
Hearings, supra note 10, at 114-15, 134-35, 150, 180-81, 239-42, 301-02.
14. Unlike I.B.R.D. loans, I.F.C. loans need not be guaranteed
by the governments of the countries in which the projects will be
carried out. See note 6 supra: compare I.B.R.D., art. III, §4(i) with
I.F.C., art. III.
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It is also a member of three regional development
institutions, which lend on a regional, rather than
world-wide, scale.
Cl) the Inter-American Development Bank
(I.A.D.B.),
C2) the Asian Development Bank (A.D.B.), and
C3) the African Development Fund (Af.D.F.).
The Af.D.F. is the soft loan arm of the
African Development Bank CAf.D.B.).
Membership in the Af.D.B. itself is currently
limited to African countries.1 5
The charters of the banks declare that their goals
are to promote economic development, that their decisions
are to be influenced solely by economic considerations,
and that they are multilateral institutions in the sens6
that they are to be independent of the control of any one
member and that all members are to have a voice in deter-
mining the policies of the banks. Given their goals and
structure, it is important that the banks function
apolitically. Private investors in the banks' securities
need to have confidence that their money is being managed
rationally and according to sound business principles.17
A number of relatively small developed countries, includ-
ing Sweden, Canada, and the Netherlands currently rely on
15. However, negotiations are now under way for membership
of the United States and other non-African countries in the Af.D.B.
.1979 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 168 (statement by C. Fred
Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International
Affairs).
This Article will refer to the World Bank, I.A.D.B., A.D.B,,
and Af.D.R./F,, collectively as "the banks." This term will be used
rather loosely, It will sometimes refer to the World Bank and its
component institutions as a unit, and it will at other times refer to
the I.B.R.D, or those other institutions individually. Also, it will
sometimes include the Af.D.B. and at other times only those institu-
tions in which the United States has membership.
16, aee notes 58-62, 65, 66, 68 infra,
17. See Bretton Woods Agreements Act: Hearings on H.R. 3314
Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 79th Cong., 1st




the banks to manage and coordinate the greater portion
of their foreign aid contributions--contributions which
each country would otherwise be forced either to manage
separately or to transfer to another international body,
such as the European Economic Community1 8 CE.E.C.). The
banks sometimes insist that borrowing countries carry
out internal reforms as a condition for receiving devel-
opment assistance. If the countries which are called
upon to carry out these reforms perceive that the banks
are acting on the basis of objective economic principles
rather than political sentiment, they will be more wil-
ling to carry out these reforms. These states would be
reluctant to carry out such reforms if they viewed the
banks as mere conduits for the demands of particular
developed member countries, or if they perceived the
banks to be demanding internal reforms purely in order to
harmonize their economic policies with the political
ideologies of most developed member countries.1 9
The banks will be better able to carry out their
work of coordinating aid flows from various countries,
of planning development projects, and of executing those
projects if they do not become embroiled in political dis-
putes. The banks are involved with member countries hav-
ing a wide range of ideologies and are themselves managed
and staffed by persons from countries of divergent politi-
cal interests.2  As long as the goals that inform the
banks' decisions are economic ones, a common basis for
agreement will exist both between the banks and member
countries and within the banks. Once the banks move away
from decisions based on solely economic criteria, however,
disagreement on appropriate non-economic goals, and on the
means of pursuing them, may become a source of conflict
threatening the banks' fundamental economic objectives.
18. E. Mason & R. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods 493,
506, 509 (1973) [hereinafter cited as E. Mason & R. Asher].
19. R. Oliver, Early Plans for a World Bank 44-45 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as R. Oliver, Early Plans]; E. Mason & R. Asher, supra note
18, at 431-34.
20. The charters declare that subject to the paramount importance
of securing the highest standards of efficiency and competence, due
regard is to be paid to the recruitment of personnel on as wide a
geographic basis as possible. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. V, §5(d);
I.F.C., art. IV, §5(d); I.D.A., art. VI, §5(d); I.A.D.B., art. VIII,
§5(e); A.D.B., art. 36, para. 6; Af.D.B., art. 37, para. 5; Af.D.F.,
art. 31, para. l see also E. Mason & R. Asher, supra note 18, at 66-72
(giving the regional composition of the World Bank's staff in the early
1970's).
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Not all official development assistance from coun-
tries such as the United States must be allocated and
managed on an apolitical basis, A large portion of United
States official development assistance is bilateral
assistance which the United States government provides
directly to recipient countries through agencies such as
the United States Agency for International Development. 21
There is no law prohibiting political criteria for United
States decisions concerning bilateral assistance. The
United States and other countries are free to allocate
their official development assistance between bilateral
and multilateral agencies, such as the banks, in any way
they see fit.
From the point of view of donor countries, such as
the United States, one advantage of bilateral assistance
is that the donor can exert greater control over direct
aid than over assistance channeled through the multi-
lateral development banks. However, channeling assistance
through the banks also has advantages. First, the banks
can mobilize and coordinate development funds from many
national governments. Second, the mechanism for financing
hard loans provides a unique way to mobilize private
capital for development purposes. The banks can borrow
wherever interests rates are lowest. Moreover, the govern-
ments of member countries currently need pay into the
I.B.R.D. and the hard loan facilities of the I.A.D.B. and
A.D.B. only a fraction of the amount which these institu-
tions can lend as hard loans. 23 Thus, for every dollar of
capital stock subscribed by members, these banks can
increase by at least a factor of ten the amount of funds
available for development loans. Third, unlike much
bilateral assistance, 2 4 loans by the banks are not tied.
21. In 1975, United States bilateral official development as-
sistance was $2,941 million while United States assistance channeled
through the banks equaled $1,066 million. S. Rep. No. 159, 95th Cong.,
ist Sess. 20, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2686.
22. Policies and Operations, supra note 7, at 29-35. The
World Bank has recently borrowed exclusively on Western European and
Japanese capital markets. 1979 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 657
(statement by Edward Fried, United States Executive Director to
World Bank, that recent borrowing by World Bank has all been on
Western European and Japanese capital markets).
23. See note 9 supra. See Table (Appendix), line 8.
24. E. Mason & R, Asher, supra note 18, at 209, 505.
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In other words, goods and services which are financed by
bank loans are to be obtained from the most economical
source. The banks are prohibited from requiring that
the proceeds of their loans be spent to pocure goods
or services from any particular country.
Fourth, the banks help to make the allocation and
management of development resources a matter of coopera-
tion and consensus between members, rather than a situa-
tion in which donor countries dictate terms to recipient
states. 2 6 Finally, the banks are sometimes able to in-
duce recipient countries to undertake necessary internal
reforms which would be politically unacceptable if demand-
ed by a donor country offering bilateral assistance.
2 7
With the exception of the prohibition against tied
loans, these advantages depend to a great extent upon the
banks' functioning as apolitical institutions. 2 8 Thus,
the very fact that members may -not control multilateral
assistance for political purposes gives multilateral
assistance several advantages over bilateral assistance.
If the apolitical character of the banks is undermined,
those advantages will disappear, and the banks will func-
tion less effectively as development institutions. Fur-
thermore, to the extent that the banks operate as effec-
tive development institutions, there will surely be
political benefits for developed members. Insofar as the
banks effectively promote economic development, they will
raise the standard of living of poor persons in develop-
ing countries and thus increase political stability in
those countries; 2 9 foster cooperation between individuals
and institutions in developing and developed countries,
and thus extend Western influence even in situations where
bilateral political cooperation between particular members
25, See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. III, §5(a); I.F.C.,
art. III, §3(iii); I.D.A., art. V, §1(f); I.A.D.B., art. III, §9(a);
A.B.D., art. 24, Af.D.B. art. 27; Af.D.F., art. 15, para. 4(a).
Note, however, the power of members to restrict the use of their
currencies in certain circumstances. See notes 76-77 infra.
26. J. White, Regional Development Banks 16-17 (1972).
27. See note 19 supra.
28. See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
29. See, e.g._, 1979 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 735,
740, 872 (statements by Fred Bergsten); 125 Cong. Rec. H6269-72
(daily ed. July 19, 1979) (statements by Reps. Long, Solarz, and
McHugh).
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is impossible; 3 0 and improve the welfare of the poor in
developing countries, not only in material ways, but
also in ways that implicate notions of social justice
and human rights.3 1
II. Earmarking Subscriptions
Numerous charter provisions forbid members to
attempt to earmark subscriptions and prohibit the banks
from accepting such earmarked subscriptions. In examin-
ing those charter provisions, this section will also con-
30. Id.; E. Mason & R. Asher, supra note 18, at 590, 594.
The Economist of London vividly states the argument that effective
foreign assistance (multilateral or bilateral) by Western countries
is an important and too often overlooked means of promoting long-term
Western political interests--even in countries whose policies are not
always aligned with those of most Western nations:
Afghanistan was not lost into the Russian military
protectorate in its tulip-dotted valleys or in the rough
fingers of the Hindu Kush. It was lost by the failing
deterrence of America. Nor did it just fall out of the
blue while the free world slept off Christmas in the
dying days of the 1970s. Afghanistan's slide away from
being one of those useful if uneasy bulwarks on
Russia's southern border began in the early and mid-
1970s. It began when congressional committees and a
Vietnam-defensive administration ignored the appeals of
American ambassadors in Kabul. It began when no
follow-up to America's large aid effort in the Hellmand
River project was forthcoming, when the Peace Corps
which worked so well around Kandahar and in other
regions was allowed to fade out. It began when the de
facto division of independent Afghanistan into two
spheres of peaceful contest--a northern tier where
Russia helped this appallingly badly run oountry, while
America and others helped in the south--was dismantled
unilaterally by American abdication from its southern
tier and from supplying arms. An ineffectual king was
toppled, coup followed coup, corruption deepened,
ministries went from lassitude to decay, tribal rebels
of centuries' standing (and brigands interested mainly
in loot) adopted the modern counter-reformation
banner of Islam. Outside "help" became all-Russian
and increasingly unpeaceful in intent.
The Economist (London), Jan. 5-11, 1980, at 7.
31. See text accompanying notes 170-77 infra.
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sider the possible bases for permitting members to ear-
mark and banks to accept earmarked subscriptions.
A. Legislative Background
During each of the past three years, the United
States House of Representatives has passed amendments
to the annual foreign assistance appropriations bills
which would prohibit United States appropriations for
the banks from being used to finance loans for certain
countries or types of projects. Vietnam and Cuba have
consistently been targets of these amendments, 3 2 de-
spite the fact that Cuba is not a member of any of the
banks and is thus not eligible to receive assistance
from them. Angola, Mozambique, Uganda, Laos, and Cam-
bodia were also targets in 1977.33 The stated reasons
for imposing these restrictions are as follows:
(a) Some of these countries are enemies
of the United States. In particular, Vietnam
was singled out because it has "caused so
much grief in thousands and thousands of
homes in this land of ours." 3 4
(b) Multilateral assistance will be
seen as a form of reparations.
3 5
(c) United States tax dollars should
not be used to aid countries whose policies
are opposed to those of the United States. 3 6
32. 123 Cong. Rec. H6346-51 (daily ed. June 22, 1977),
H6421-22 (daily ed. June 23, 1977); 124 Cong. Rec. H8555-58, H8563
(daily ed. Aug. 14, 1978); 125 Cong. Rec. H6157-65 (daily ed. July
18, 1979), H7293-7300, H7301-02 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979).
33. 123 Cong. Rec. H6346-51 (daily ed. June 22, 1977),
H6385-88 (daily ed. June 23, 1977).
34. 123 Cong. Rec. H6347 (daily ed. June 22, 1977) (state-
ment by Rep. Ashbrook); 124 Cong. Rec. H8555 (daily ed. Aug. 14,
1978) (statement by Rep. Young).
35. 123 Cong. Rec. H6347 (daily ed. June 22, 1977) (state-
ment by Rep. Gilman).
36. For example, restrictions against Angola and Mozambique
were supported on the grounds that the governments of those states
involved themselves in the affairs of other nations and sought to
impose Mr. Mugabe or Mr. Nkomo on the Rhodesian people. Id. at
H6385, H6388 (daily ed. June 23, 1977) (statements by Reps. Crane
and Bauman),
1980]
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(d) Laos and Vietnam have been un-
cooperative in accounting for United States
servicemen missing in action. 37
(e) Preventing the banks from using
United States appropriations to assist
these countries will be a way to demon-
strate United States objections to the
policies of these countries. 38
(f) These countries have bad human
rights records. One congressman said
that while they were not the only countries
with bad human rights records, it would be
better to try to cut off multilateral
assistance to some human rights violators
than to none at all. 39
(g) Because the United States has cut
off direct (bilateral) assistance to these
countries, it should, to be consistent, cut
off indirect (multilateral) assistance to
them as well. 4 0
(h) The banks do not permit congressmen
to attend their board meetings. 41
(i) Multilateral assistance allows the
President too much discretion vis-h.-vis
Congress in the field of foreign assistance;
in particular, Congress should give specific
approval for United States lending through
the banks just as it must give specific
approval for United States bilateral aid
programs.4 2
37. 123 Cong. Rec. H6347 (daily ed. June 22, 19.77) (state-
ment by Rep. Kemp); 124 Cong. Rec. 18557 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1978)
(statement by Rep. Dornan).
38. 123 Cong. Rec. H6347 (daily ed. June 22, 1977) (state-
ment by Rep. Gilman).
39. Id. at H6351 (statement by Rep. Harkin); see generalZy
notes 32, 33 supra.
40. 123 Cong. Rec. H6350 (daily ed. June 22, 1977) (state-
ment by Rep. Badham).
41. Id. at H6347 (statement by Rep. Bauman).
42. 123 Cong. Rec. H6385 (daily ed. June 23, 1977) Cstate-
ment by Rep. Crane).
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In addition, in 1977 the House of Representatives
passed an amendment to the foreign assistance appropri-
ations bill to prevent United States subscriptions to
the banks from being used to encourage "production of
sugar, palm oil or citrus crops, if the United States
is a producer of the same, similar or competing, agri-
cultural commodity."4 3 The avowed purpose of this amend-
ment was to protect United States producers of these
products.
B. Charter Prohibitions Against the Banks Accepting
Earmarked Funds and Against Member Countries
Attempting to Earmark Funds
The charters44 of the banks clearly state member
nations rights and obligations. The United States Con-
gress has not enacted the charters as a whole into
United States law,4 5 nor has the Senate ratified the
charters as treaties. However, the charter of each
bank contains a provision which requires, as a precon-
dition to membership by any country, that the govern-
ment of that country accept the charter in accordance
with its laws and take all steps necessary to enable
it to carry out its obligations under the charter.4 6 In
the case of each bank, the Congress has passed legisla-
tion authorizing the President to accept membership for
the United States in that bank as provided by the
charter of that bank.4 7 Thus, while the charters are
not constitutionally laws of the United States, they
are statements of rights and obligations which the
United States has pledged to uphold and which the Con-
43. Id. at H6413-14 (amendment offered by Rep. Moore).
44. See note 6 supra.
45. The Congress has explicitly incorporated into the law of
the United States only those charter provisions that deal with the
privileges and immunities of the banks. 22 U.S.C. §§ 282g (I.F.C.),
283g (I.A.D.B.), 284g (I.D.A.), 285g (A.D.B.), 286h (I.B.R.D.),
2 90g-7 (Af.D.F.) (1976).
46. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. XI, §2(a); I.F.C.,
art. IX, §2(a); I.D.A., art. XI, §2(a); I.A.D.B., art. XV, §1(a);
A.D.B., art. 57.
47. 22 U.S.C. §§ 282 (I.F.C.), 283 (I.A.D.B.), 284 (I.D.A.),
285 (A.D.B.), 286 (I.B.R.D.), 290g (Af.D.F.).
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gress has confirmed.4 8 While there are few judicial
decisions dealing with the force of the charters of
the Banks and the International M onetary 'Fund CT.M.F.)
in United States law, those that do exist acknowledge
the binding force of these charters on the United States
and on governmental institutions within the United
States.49
The charter of each bank contains five stipulations
which are relevant to the earmarking issue:
(1) All decisions of the banks must relate
to their development purposes;50
(2) Only economic considerations are relevant
to the banks' decisions;51
48. During the Senate Hearings on the Bretton Woods Agree-
ments Act (22 U.S.C. § 286 and 31 U.S.C. § 822(a) (1976)), the act
authorizing the President to accept membership for the United States
in the I.B.R.D. and the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.), the
Department of State analyzed many previous international agree-
ments that the Congress merely authorized the President to accept
but did not formally incorporate into the laws of the United States.
That analysis concluded that United States participation in
the I.B.R.D. and I.M.F. need not be effected by treaty, but could
instead be effected by an act of the Congress authorizing the
President to sign the charters of those institutions, and that United
States participation would not involve an unlawful delegation of
legislative power to those institutions or to foreign countries.
49. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment and International Monetary Fund v. All America Cables & Radio,
Inc., 17 F.C.C. 450 (1953), excerpted in F. Kirgis, International
Organizations in Their Legal Setting 342-44 (1977); Banco do Brasil,
S.A. v. A. C. Israel Commodity Co., Inc., 12 N.Y. 2d 371, 190 N.E.
2d 235, 239 N.Y.S. 2d 872 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964);
and Banco Frances e Brasileiro S.A. v. John Doe no. 1, 36 N.Y. 2d
592, 331 N.E. 2d 502, 370 N.Y.S. 2d 534 (1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 867 (1975).
For further discussion of the force which United States
courts have accorded the Bretton Woods Agreements under United
States law, see generally J. Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts
(1962); see also J. Gold, Voting and Decisions in the International
Monetary Fund 108 n. 21 (1972) [hereinafter cited as J. Gold,
Voting and Decisions]. For more recent cases than those cited at
id., see Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1366-67 (2d Cir.
1973); John Sanderson & Co. (Wool) Pty., Ltd. v. Ludlow Jute Co.,
Ltd., 569 F.2d 696, 699 (1st Cir. 1978).
50. See note 55 infra.
51. See note 57 infra.
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C3) Authority oyer the -use of the banksI
resources rests with their boards of
directoTs; 52
C4) Members must not attempt to influence
the presidents and staffs of the banks
in the discharge of their duties;S3
C5) Members may not restrict the use of their
currencies by the banks.54
Each stipulation, with its implications for legislative
attempts to earmark funds, is discussed below.
1. All Decisions of the Banks aMust Relate to Their
Development Purposes.
The charters of the banks declare that the pur-
poses of the banks all involve encouraging economic
development in developing member countries, and require
that the banks be guided by these purposes in all their
decisions. 55  The charters of the I.A.D.B. and the
52. See notes 61, 62 infra.
53. See note 73 infra.
54. See note 74 infra.
55. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. I; I.F.C., art. I;
I.D.A., art. I; A.D.B., arts. 1, 2, 8; cf. I.A.D.B., art. I (as
amended), art. III, § 1; Af.D.B., arts. 1, 2; Af.D.F., arts. 2, 14
(mentioning contributions to social development). For example, the
A.D.B. charter declares:
The purpose of the Bank shall be to foster economic
growth and co-operation in the region of Asia and
the Far East (hereinafter referred to as the "region")
and to contribute to the acceleration of the process
of economic development of the developing member
countries in the region, collectively and individually.
To fulfill its purpose, the Bank shall have the
following functions:
(i) to promote investment in the region of public
and private capital for development purposes;
Cii) to utilize the resources at its disposal for
financing development of the developing member
countries in the region, giving priority to
those . . . pxojects and programs which will
contribute most effectively to the harmonious
economic growth of the region as a whole, and
having special regard to the needs of the
smaller or less developed member countries in
,the region;
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A.D.B. make this last obligation even clearer by declar-
ing that the resources and the facilities of these banks
shall be used exclusively to implement the purposes and
functions set forth in the charters. 56
It is clear from the debates in the House of Repre-
sentatives that the earmarking amendments directed
against particular countries were not intended to serve
development purposes. If implemented, their effect
would be inimical to the banks' development purposes
because they would hinder the operations of the banks
and undermine the common basis for agreement both with-
in the banks and between the banks and member countries.
Similarly, there is no development purpose to be
served by earmarking in order to preserve the market
share of producers of particular agricultural commodi-
ties. Channeling assistance away from the production
of commodities which are in surplus on world markets may
well serve a legitimate development purpose, but this
purpose must be distinguished from actions designed to
preserve the market share of producers of commodities
which are not in surplus.
55. (continued)
(iii) [to assist members in the region] in the
coordination of their development policies
and plans with a view to achieving better
utilization of their resources, making
their economies more complementary, and
promoting the orderly expansion of their
foreign trade, in particular, intra-
regional trade;
(iv) to provide technical assistance for the
preparation, financing and execution of
development projects and programs, .
(v) to co-operate . . . with the United Nations
. and with other international institu-
tions, as well as national entities whether
public or private, which are concerned with
the investment of development funds in the
region, . .
(vi) to undertake such other activities and
provide such other services as may advance
its purpose.
A.D.B., art. 2 (emphasis supplied).




2. Only Economic Considerations are Relevant to the
Banks' Decisions.
All of the charters declare in nearly identical
language that:
The Bank and its Officers shall
not interfere in the political affairs
of any member, nor shall they be influ-
enced in their decisions by the politi-
cal character of the member or members
concerned.
Only economic considerations shall
be relevant to their decisions, and
these considerations shall be weighed
impartially in order to achieve the
purposes stated in Article 1.57
It is clear that many of the congressional propos-
als for earmarking were motivated by the political
character of certain members of the banks. If the
banks were to implement the amendments, whether merely
symbolically, by segregating United States contribu-
tions, or actually by reducing assistance to the tar-
get countries, they would discriminate against these
countries on the basis of their political character.
Moreover, the proposed amendments are not at all based
upon economic considerations relevant to the purposes
of the banks. Were the banks to implement these
amendments on the ground that they were being forced
to do so, their action would make a mockery of the
letter and spirit of the charters as well as the notion
that the decision-making authority of the banks is
independent of the will of any particular member
country. The banks cannot maintain their integrity
as independent institutions if they permit themselves
to be forced into actions or policies their charters
would not permit them to undertake voluntarily.
57. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. IV, §10. See also
I.F.C., art. III, §9; I.D.A., art V, §6; Af.D.B., art. 38, para. 2;
Af.D.F., art. 21. See generally I.A.D.B., art. III, §1(f); A.D.B.,
art. 36, para. 2.
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3. Authority Over the Use of the Banks' Resources
Rests with Their Boards of Directors.
The powers of each bank are vested in its board of
governors. 58  Each member country can appoint one
governor to the board;59 members are usually represented
by their ministers of finance. 60 Responsibility for the
conduct of the bank's general operations rests with the
bank's board of directors, 61 to which the board of
governors may delegate nearly all its powers, with the
notable exception of the powers to admit or suspend
members and to increase or decrease the capital stock.62
A member's cumulative subscriptions to a bank deter-
mines whether that member will be able to appoint a
director or whether it must join a coalition of other
countries to elect a director; 6 3 in all the banks except
the Af.D.F., the United States' subscriptions are suf-
ficient to permit it to appoint its own director. 64
58. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. V, §2(a); I.F.C., art.
IV, §2(a); I.D.A., art. VI, §2(a); I.A.D.B., art. VIII, §2(a);
A.D.B., art. 28, para. 1; Af.D.B., art. 29, para. 1; Af.D.F., art.
23, para. 1.
59. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. V, §2(a); I.F.C.,
art. IV, §2(b); I.D.A., art. VI, §2(b); I.A.D.B., art. VIII, §2(a);
A.D.B., art. 27, para. 1; Af.D.B., art. 30, para. 1; Af.D.F.,
art. 24, para. 2.
60. See, e.g., Asian Development Bank, Basic Information
22-30 (1977).
61. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. V, §4(a); I.F.C., art.
IV, §4(a); I.D.A., art. VI, §4(a); I.A.D.B., art. VIII, §3(a);
A.D.B., art. 31; Af.D.B., art. 32; Af.1).F., art. 26.
62. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. V, §2(b); I.F.C., art.
IV, §2(c); I.A.D.B., art. VII, §2(b); A.D.B., art. 28, para 2;
Af.D.B., art. 29, para. 2; Af.D.F., art. 23, para. 2. Cf. I.D.A.,
art. VI, §2(c) (admit or suspend members or "authorize additional
subscriptions and determine the terms and conditions relating
thereto").
63. Except in the case of the Af.D.F., only subscriptions
to each bank's hard Zoan facility determine whether a member may
appoint a director to that bank. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art.
V, §4(b), Schedule B; I.F.C., art. IV, §4(b); I.D.A., art. VI,
§4(b); I.A.D.B., art. VIII, §3(b), Annex C; A.D.B., art. 30, para. 1;
Af.D.B., art. 33, para. 1, Annex B; Af.D.F., art. 27, para. 2,
Schedule B.
64. S. Rep. No. 159, 95th Cong., ist Sess. 69, reprinted in
[1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2670, 2732.
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Each director's voting power is determined by the vot-
ing power of either the country which appointed him or
the countries which elected him.6 5 A country's voting
power increases with its contributions to the general
resources of the bank.66 The United States director
in the I.A.D.B. has sufficient voting power to veto
managerial decisions, including loan decisions, in the
soft loan facility of the I.A.D.B.6 7 In no other
instance does any member have sufficient voting power to
veto general managerial decisions in any bank.6 8
65. See note 6 supra; I.B.R.D., art. V, k3; I.F.C., art. Y,
§4(c); I.D.A., art. VI, §4(c); I.A.D.B., art. VIII, §4; A.D.B.,
art. 33, para. 3; Af.D.B., art. 35, para. 3; Af.D.F., art. 29, para.
4.
66. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. V, §3; I.F.C., art. IV,
§3; I.D.A., art. VI, §3; I.A.D.B., art. IV, §9, art. VIII, §4; A.D.B.,
art. 33, para. 1; Af.D.B., art. 35, para. 1; Af.D.F., art. 29, para.
3. However, the relationship between total voting power and total
contributions to resources is not proportional. In addition to a
certain number of votes that are allotted in proportion to each
member's contributions, a separate block of votes (which is larger
in some institutions than in others) is divided equally among all
members. This division gives members with small contributions
(which are generally the poorer members) more voting power than
they would have under a strictly proportional allocation of voting
power. See Table (Appendix), lines 5 and 6.
67. 1978 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 634.
68. Compare data on the distribution of voting power in the
banks in 1979 House H earings, supra note 10, at 128-29, 144-45, 331,
253, 212, and in International Finance Corporation, 1978 Annual
Report 40 (1978) with the charter provisions specifying the number
of votes required to approve general managerial decisions. See
note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. V, §3; I.F.C., art. IV, §3; I.D.A.,
art. VI, §3; I.A.D.B., art. IV, §9, art. VIII, §4; A.D.B., art. 33,
para. 3; Af.D.B., art. 35, para. 3; Af.D.F., art. 29, para. 7.
Approval of general managerial decisions requires a majority
of the represented voting power, except in the Af.D.F., and the
soft loan facility of the I.A.D.B. (the Fund for Special Operations)
where three-fourths and two-thirds majorities, respectively, are
required. As a matter of practice, however, virtually all loans
are approved by consensus. The managements of the banks try to
accommodate any objections from directors in advance of any formal
objection to a particular loan proposal. Formal votes are infre-
quent, but the secretaries of the banks are sometimes asked to
record a member country as dissenting or abstaining when a
particular loan is under consideration. E. Mason & R. Asher, supra
note 18, at 92-93.
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The foregoing information is important with regard
to earmarking because it demonstrates that, with the
exception of a few specifically enumerated powers, all
authority of the banks is vested in their boards of
directors. One of the central powers of the banks is
the capacity to decide how to allocate their resources. 69
Since the exercise of this power lies within the author-
ity of the board of directors, it cannot be subject to
unilateral interference from members. The congression-
al proposals outlined above would, if passed, represent
impermissible interference with this authority.
4. Members Must not Attempt to InfZuence the
Presidents and Staffs of the Banks in the
Discharge of Their Duties.
Each bank has a president who is elected by either
the board of governors or the board of directors. 7 0 The
president directs the staff of the bank and conducts,
under the guidance of the directors, the ordinary busi-
ness of the bank.7 1 As a practical matter, actual con-
trol over the oper.ations of the banks lies with the
presidents and the management staffs of the banks, and
the directors must rely substantially upon these per-
68. (Continued)
The United States has veto power over decisions to amend the
charters of, and to increase the number of directors in, the
I.B.R.D., I.F.C., I.D.A., and I.A.D.B. These decisions require
four-fifths approval in the case of the I.B.R.D., I.F.C., and
I.D.A. and three-fourths approval in the case of the I.A.D.B. See note 6
supra: I.B.R.D., art. V, §4(b)(ii), art. VIII, §(a); I.F.C., art. IV,
§4(b), art. VII, §(a); I.D.A., art. VI, §4(b), art. IX, §(a); I.A.D.B.,
art. VIII, §3(j), art. XII, §(a).
69. See note 61 supra, note 76 infra.
70. In the World Bank and African Development Bank/Fund, the
directors elect the president, while in the I.A.D.B. and A.D.B. the
boards of governors elect the president. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D.,
art. V, §5(a); I.D.A., art. VI, §5(a); I.A.D.B., art. VIII, §5(a);
A.D.B., art. 34, para. 1; Af.D.B., art. 36; Af.D.F., art. 30, para. 1.
Cf. I.F.C., art. IV, §5(a) (permitting directors to choose, on the
recommendation of World Bank President, a different person to be I.F.C.
President).
71. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. V, §5(b); I.D.A., art. VI,
§5(b); I.A.D.B., art. VIII, §5(a); A.D.B., art. 34, para. 5; Af.D.B.,
art. 37, para. 2; Af.D.F., art. 22, art. 30, paras. 1, 2. Cf. I.F.C.,




sons for information on policy issues, 72
The charters of the banks declare in nearly identi-
cal language:
The president, officers and staff of
the bank, in the discharge of their
offices, owe their duty entirely to the
bank and to no other authority. Each mem-
ber of the bank shall respect the interna-
tional character of this duty and shall
refrain from all attempts to influence
them in the discharge of their duties.73
Members' legitimate influence must be channeled entire-
ly through the governors and directors.
5. Members May Not Restrict the Use of Their
Currencies by the Banks.
In general, members of the banks may not place any
restrictions on the use of their currencies by the
banks.74 This prohibition directly forecloses the ear-
marking of subscriptions. There are, however, four
exceptions to this general rule. First, and most impor-
tant with respect to the earmarking issue, is that a mem-
ber of the I.B.R.D. has the power to veto the use of its
currency if that currency constitutes part of that mem-
ber's paid-in subscription.7 5 The drafting history of
the I.B.R.D. charter, however, indicates that this
power was intended to allow certain members to guard
against inflationary demands for their exports in the
years immediately following World War II, and not to
72. Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations for 1980:
Hearings Before a Sulconm. on Foreign Operations of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, Part 2, 96th Cong., 1st. Sess. 82-83
(1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 House Investigative Report].
73. The charter of the I.A.D.B. does not contain this last
clause. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. V, §5(c); I.F.C., art. IV,
§5(c); I.D.A., art. VI, §5(c); A.D.B., art. 36, para. 3; Af.D.B.,
art. 38, para. 3.
74. See note 6 supra: I.F.C., art. III, §2; I.D.A., art.
IV, §1; A.D.B., art. 24; Af.D.B., art. 27; Af.D.F., art. 11.
75. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. IV, §2(a). Currently,
ten percent of each member's subscription to the I.B.R.D. must
actually be paid into the I.B.R.D. Policies and Operations, supra
note 7, at 25-26.
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allow members to veto loans for political reasons.
7 6
According to the I.B.R.D., this power has been used
only for balance of payments reasons,7 7 In any event,
the I.B.R.D. has unrestricted use of those currencies
raised by borrowings on financial markets and of those
currencies purchased on foreign exchange markets.
78
Second, a member of the I.A.D.B. may restrict up
to one-half of its currency subscriptions to the
I.A.D.B.'s soft loan facility and one-half of its
paid-in subscriptions to the bank's hard loan facility.
However, it may restrict such use only to the extent
of requiring that its currency be used to purchase
goods and services produced in its own territory.
7 9
The I.A.D.B. charter explicitly prohibits members from
requiring that the proceeds of a loan not be spent in
a particular member country.8 0 Thus, in the case of
the I.A.D.B., members may restrict the use of their
currencies only for balance of payments purposes, and
may not target such restrictions for or against any
particular countries or projects. The third exception
to the general rule against restrictions permits
develop-tng countries to restrict the use of their cur-
rencies by the I.D.A., A.D.B., and Af.D.B. to protect
their balance of payments positions and to prevent
76. The official documents of the Bretton Woods Conference
state that the reason for including article IV, §2 in the I.B.R.D.
charter was "related to a possible shortage of the goods required
in the subscribing countr[ies] concerned, and not to any general
desire to control the use of currency subscribed to the Bank."
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods:
Original Documents and Working Papers, Doc. #336 at 3 (Report
of Subcommittees A and B of Committee 2, on the Operations of the
Bank, to Commission II, July 12, 1944).
In addition, Robert Oliver writes, "Many Americans feared
the potential inflationary repercussions on the American economy
of large foreign loans [to finance exports of United States pro-
ducts] in the post-war period." R. Oliver, International Economic
Co-operation and the World Bank, 172 n. 22 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as R. Oliver]. See also Oliver's discussion of I.B.R.D.,
art. 4, sec. 2, id. at 171-72, 197-200.
77. R. Oliver, supra note 76, at 197.
78. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. IV, §2Cd); R. Oliver,
supra note 76, at 197-98.
79. See note 6 supra: I.A.D.B., art. V, §lCa).
80. See note 6 supra: I.A.D.B., art. III, §9(,a).
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their domestic productive capacities from being over,
strained. 81
Finally, members or non-members may make special
contributions to the banks to be used for specific pur-
poses. 82 United States contributions to the I.A.D.B.
through the Social Progress Trust Fund, established in
1961 by a special agreement between the United States
and the I.A.D.B., are one example of such special con-
tributions.83 The resources of this fund were used to
support efforts of Latin American countries to carry
out institutional reforms and, in particular, to assist
economically the lowest income groups in Latin America.84
Special subscriptions give the donor country no addi
tional voting power.85 Moreover, they must be made on
terms and conditions which are consistent with the pur-
poses of the banks.8 6
C. Rejection by the I.A.D.B. of Earmarked
Subscriptions
In 1975, the United States Congress earmarked $50
million of the $235 million United States appropriation
to the Fund for Special Operations, t'he soft loan facil,
Ity of the I.A.DB.., to cooperatives, to local credit
unions, and to savings and loan associations that serve
the most economically disadvantaged people in Latin
America.87 In a letter to the United States Secretary
df the Treasury, the President of the I.A.D.B. said
that the I.A.D.B. could not accept the earmarked funds
81. See note 6 supra: I.D;A., art. IV, §l A.D.R.P art. 24
§§l, 2; Af.D.R., art. 27.
82. Some of the charters specifically provide for such con-
tributions. See note 6 supra: I.D.A., art. 4, §1(c); A.D.B.,
art. 19, para. 3; Af.D.B., art. 8, art. 28, para. 2(b); Af.D.F.,
art. 8.
83. Social Progress Trust Fund Agreement, June 19, 1961,
United States--Inter-American Development Bank, 12 U.S.T. 632,
T.I.A.S. No. 4763. The United States stopped providing resources
in 1964, favoring instead contributions to the Fund for Special
Operations in order that other countries could bear some of the
financial burden involved in trying to achieve the goals of the
Social Progress Trust Fund Agreement,
84. Id., art. I, §§ 1.03-1.05.
85. See note 6 supra.
86. See note 6 supra: A.D.B., art. 19, para. 3; Af.D.B.,
art. 8; Af.D.F., art, 8.
87. 22 U.S.C. §§ 283p-283s (89 Stat. 23 (1975)) (repealed hy
90 Stat. 592 (1976)).
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for several reasons.88 First, for the IA.D.B. to ac-
cept such funds as part of a general replenishment of
its resources would deprive the Board of Governors and
the Executive Directors of their authority to determine
which areas of lending the I.A.D.B. should pursue.
Second, the I.A.D.B. charter forbids pre-commitments of
the I.A.D.B.'s general resources.89 Third, I.A.D.B.
acceptance of the earmarked funds "would open the
door for all members to similarly lay down terms govern-
ing the use of their respective contributions and sub-
scriptions. ... [This] would do irreparable harm to the
international cooperative character of this or any
similar institution. "90
The President stressed that the inability to ac-
cept the earmarked funds did not stem from opposition
to channeling assistance through grass roots self-help
institutions in order to benefit the poorest people in
society. Indeed, the Bank had itself decided to make
available to such institutions loans far in excess of
the amounts Congress had earmarked. Rather, the Bank
refused the funds to protect its multilateral character
and, in particular, to insure that "[amny decision to
dedicate resources for a particular purpose should be
determined in a multilateral manner in accordance with
the decisionmaking process provided in the Bank's
charter, so that all members contribute with the same
understanding. "91
D. The Banks Must Reject Earmarked Funds
Earmarking subscriptions is incompatible with the
past practices of the banks and with those provisions
of their charters which establish Ca) the independent
status of the banks, 92 (b) the system of multilateral
control over the banks, 93 and Cc) the complete au-
thority of the banks over the use of their resources--
including contributions and capital subscriptions from
member countries.9 4 The most significant exception to
88. Letters from Antonio Ortiz Mena to William E. Simon
(Apr. 23, 1975, and Feb. 19, 1976) Con file with Yale Studies in
World Public Orderl.
89. See note 6 supra: I.A.D.B., art. III, §7.
90. Letter from Antonio Ortiz Mena to William E. Simon, Apr.
23, 1975 (on file with Yale Studies in World Public Order).
91. Id.
92. S~e note 73 supra.
93. See notes 58-69 supra.
9.4. See note 74 supra.
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this statement is the power of members of the IRR.D.
to veto loans of so much of their currency as consti-
tutes the paid-in portion of their subscriptions. How-
ever, the history of the I.B.R.D. charter indicates
that members were not intended to use this power to
veto loans for political reasons.
This narrow interpretation of the currency-veto
power finds strong support in those charter provisions
that state that the decisions of the banks shall be
based solely on economic considerations, and that the
banks' development purposes shall guide all such deci-
sions. These provisions are the strongest affirmation
of the apolitical character and strict development
orientation of the banks. They clearly prohibit the
banks from taking any actions based upon non-economic
considerations. To have any effect, these provisions
must require members to respect the apolitical charac-
ter of the banks and refrain from any attempts to use
their participation in the banks to further unilateral
political goals at the expense of the banks' develop-
ment objectives. To be consistent with this last re-
quirement-, the currency-veto power in the I.B.R.D.
should be narrowly construed. Members should not be
able to veto the use of their currencies for loans to
particular countries or projects simply because they
do not like the political character of those countries,
or because those projects would hurt the economic
interests of special interest groups.
Given this interpretation of the currency-veto
power, members have no power in any of the banks to
earmark funds in the manner in which the House of
Representatives has attempted to earmark United States
subscriptions. Concomitantly, the banks have no au-
thority to acquiesce in recent congressional earmarking
demands. Indeed, the banks' apolitical character, ex-
clusively development-oriented purposes, independent
status, and multilateral structure compel them to re-
ject earmarked funds.
III. Requiring Directors to Oppose Loans for Reasons
Unrelated to Economic Devolopment
This section will examine, first, the background
of the current requirements that United States direc-
tors oppose all loans to certain countries and pro-
jects, second, the reasons to impute a limited repre-
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sentative character to the role of U.S. directors, and
third, the reasons to conclude that this representative
role is limited by the apolitical character of the banks.
A. Legislative Background
Following passage by the House of Representatives
of the 1977 earmarking amendments, 95 the President of
the World Bank, the general counsels of the World Bank,
I.A.D.B., and A.D.B., the Congressional Research Service
of the Library of Congress, the District of Columbia Bar
Association, the General Counsel of the United States
Department of the Treasury, and the American Bar Asso-
ciation all submitted opinions opposing the earmarking
amendments and stating that the banks would not or
should not accept subscriptions earmarked according to
the House amendments. 9 6 The United States Senate
refused to accept the amendments. 9 7 The House of Repre-
95. See notes 32, 33 supra,
96. 1978 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 490-513 (Letters
from Robert McNamara to W. Michael Blumenthal (July 5, 1977), from
A. Broches (Vice-President and General Counsel of the World Bank)
to Edward Fried (U.S. Executive Director of the World Bank) (Sept.
28, 1977), from Arnold Weiss (General Counsel, I.A.D.B.) to Ralph
Dungan (U.S. Executive Director, I.A.D.B.) (Sept. 28, 1977), from
Graeme F. Rea (General Counsel, A.D.B.) to Lester Edmond (U.S.
Executive Director, A.D.B.) (Oct. 14, 1977), from the Comptroller
General of the United States to Clarence D. Long (Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Committee on
Appropriations) (Sept. 22, 1977), from the American Law Division
of the Congressional Research Service to the House Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs Comm. (Nov. 16, 1977), and from Stephen Ives, Jr.
(Chairman, Steering Committee of the International Law and Transac-
tions Division of the District of Columbia Bar) to Senator Inouye
(Chairman, Senate Subcomm. on Foreign Operations) (July 22, 1977);
United States Department of the Treasury memorandum from Robert
Mundheim (General Counsel) to Secretary Blumenthal (Sept. 29, 1977));
resolution of the American Bar Association and accompanying report.
The resolution is reprinted in American Bar Association House of
Delegates, Summary of Action Taken by the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association 27 (annual meeting, Dallas, Texas,
Aug. 14-15, 1979).
97. H.R. Rep. No. 633 (Conference. Report), 95th Cong., 1st.
Sess. 11, 17 (1977).
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sentatives agreed to withdraw its amendments only after
President Carter pledged to instruct United States
directors in the banks to "oppose and vote against"
throughout fiscal year 1978 any loans to the seven
countries mentioned in the House earmarking amendments.
President Carter made a similar pledge concerning any
loans for the production of the three agricultural com-
modities mentioned in the House amendments, if such pro-
duction were for export and could injure United States
producers. 9 8 Congress nevertheless enacted a provision
requiring United States representatives in the banks to
"oppose any loan or other financial assistance for
establishing or expanding production for export of palm
oil, sugar, or citrus crops if such loan or assistance
will cause injury to United States producers of the same,
similar, or competing agricultural commodity." 99
In 1978 House earmarking provisions against Viet-
nam and CubalbO were withdrawn in conference committee.1 01
In 1979, however, House conferees agreed to delete simi-
lar provisions only after the President of the World
Bank pledged that the Bank would not make any new loans
to Vietnam in fiscal year 1980.102
B. Reasons to Impute a Representative Character to the
Role of the Directors
Since fiscal year 1978, it has remained United
States policy, "consistent with the will of the Congress,"
to oppose all loans by the banks to Vietnam.1 03
This segment of the Article inquires whether oppo-
sition of this type is compatible with the obligations of
bank members under the banks' charters. The inquiry will
98. Letter from President Carter to Rep. Clarence Long
(Chairman, Subcomm. on Foreign Operations of the House Appropria-
tions Comm.) (Oct. 6, 1977), reprinted in 1978 House Hearings, supra
note 2, at 472; see also, H.R. Rep. No. 701, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
10-11, 16-17 (1977).
99. 22 U.S.C.A. §262g(a).
100. 124 Cong. Rec. H8555-58, H8563 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1978).
101. H.R. Rep. No. 1754, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17.
102. [1979] Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2504 (Nov. 3, 1979).
103. 1979 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 734 (statement by
C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Interna-
tional Affairs).
1980] 387
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
begin with an analysis of the extent to which directors
may, in their capacity as representatives, be bound by
the wishes of the countries which appointed or elected
them. It will then consider the extent to which direc-
tors, along with the countries which appointed or
elected them, must act in accordance both with the pur-
poses of the banks and prohibitions against the banks
basing decisions on political considerations.
1. The Charters
The charters of the banks declare that the presi-
dents, officers, and staffs of the banks, in the dis-
charge of their offices, owe their duty entirely to the
banks and to no other authorities; and that each member
country shall respect the international character of
this duty and shall refrain from all attempts to influ-
ence any of these persons in the discharge of his or
her duties.104 At least in the case of the World Bank,
it is clear that the directors are not "officers" of
the Bank for the purposes of this provision. The char-
ters of the World Bank institutions speak about the
power of the President of the World Bank,1 05 to appoint
the officers and staffs of those institutions. 1 06 In
contrast, the directors are either appointed or elected
by member countries, not by the presidents of the banks.
There exists, therefore, a negative implication
that the directors do not owe their duty exclusively to
the banks, and that they are not international civil
servants in the same sense as the presidents, officers,
and staffs of the banks.107
104. See note 75 supra.
105. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. V, §5(a); I.D.A.,
art. VI, §5(b). Cf. I.F.C., art. IV, §5(b) (more control to board
of directors). The I.F.C. charter allows for a different person
to serve as President of the I.F.C., but Robert McNamara currently
serves as president of all three institutions of the World Bank.
International Finance Corporation, 1978 Annual Report 44.
106. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. V, §5(d); I.F.C.,
art. IV, §5(b); I.D.A., art. VI, §5(d); I.A.D.B., art. VIII, §5(e);
A.D.B., art. 34, para. 6; Af.D.B., art. 37, para. 2; Af.D.F., art.
32.
107. Bitterman, Negotiation of the Articles of Agreement of
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 5 Int'l
Law. 59, 79 (1971)Jhereinafter cited as Bitterman].
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2. The National Advisory Council on International
Monetary and Financial Problems/Policies
The National Advisory Council on International
Monetary and Fiscal Problems was established by the
United States Congress in the Bretton Woods Agreements
ActlO8 in order "to coordinate the policies and opera-
tions of the representatives of the United States on the
Fund and the Bank and of all agencies of the Government
which make or participate in making foreign loans or
which engage in foreign financial, exchange or monetary
transactions, ..."109 The specifically enumerated
functions of the Council were:
(a) to coordinate the actions of the United States
representatives to the I.M.F. and the banks with the
agencies dealing with foreign loans and financial affairs;
(b) to recommend to the President general policy
guidelines for United States representatives to the I.M.F.
and the banks;
(c) to consult with the President and the United
States representatives on any major administrative prob-
lems of the I.M.F. and the banks;
Cd) whenever the charters of these institutions
required the United States to give its approval before
specific action, to decide, under the direction of the
President, whether to give that approval;
Ce) to transmit annual reports to the President
and Congress with respect to the participation of the
United States in these institutions; and
(f) to make such reports and recommendations to the
President as he should request, or as the Council might
consider necessary.
In addition, United States representatives to these
institutions were required to keep the Council fully in-
formed of their activities.ll0
108. 22 U.S.C. §§ 286-290g. For details of the Bretton Woods
Act, see note 133 infra,
109. 22 U.S.C. §§ 282(b), 283(b), 284(b), 285(b), 286(b),
290g-2. The Council consisted of the Secretaries of State, Commerce
and Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, and the
President of the Export-Import Bank.
110. 22 U.S.C. § 286b(b), (c). In 1965, the Council was
abolished, but it was reestablished in 1966 by Executive Order 11269
which also changed its name to the National Advisory Council on
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3. The Requirement of Senate Con firmation
Under the terms of the legislation authorizing the
President to accept United States membership in the
banks, the appointment of U.S. governors and directors
to these institutions is subject to Senate confirma-
tion.111
4. Congressional Interpretation of the Role of United
States Directors
There can be little doubt that the Congress has
believed that United States directors in the banks are
to represent United States interests in the banks. For
instance, a House of Representatives committee report
on the Bretton Woods Agreements Act noted with approvl
that the members of the National Advisory Council on
International Monetary and Fiscal Problems "will be in
a position to see whether the representatives of the
United States on the Fund and the Bank exercise their
authority in accordance with the best interests of the
United States."ll2 As another example, in the context
of recommending an increase in United States contribu-
tions to the Fund for Special Operations of the I.A.D.B.,
a 1965 House committee report noted: "[S]hould the
necessity arise, the United States would be in a posi-
tion to veto any proposed action [by the Fund for
Special Operations] that ran counter to an important
U.S. policy interest."11 3
110. (Continued)
International Monetary and Financial Policies, Exec. Order No.
11269, 3 C.F.R. 534 (1966-70 compilation), reprinted in 22 U.S.C.A,
§286b at 206 (1979)[hereinafter cited as Exec. Order No. 11269].
The new Council has explicit authority to "review proposed individ-
ual loan, financial, exchange or monetary transactions," authority
which the Bretton Woods Agreements Act did not explicitly confer
upon the old Council. -In addition, Executive Order 11269 gives
the Secretary of the Treasury explicit authority "to instruct
the representatives of the United States to the international
financial institutions"--authority that was lacking under the
Bretton Woods Agreement.
111. 22 U.S.C. §§285a (a), 286a (a). See also §§282a, 284(a)
(regarding creation of governor, executive director, and alternates).
112. House Comm. on Banking and Currency, Participation of
the United States in the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development, H.R. Rep. No. 629,
79th Cong., 1st. Sess. 66 (1945).
113. H.R. Rep. No. 27, 89th Cong., 1st. Sess. 9, reprinted in
[1965] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1426, 1434.
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C. Directors Must Respect the Apolitical Nature of
the Hanks
Both the banks' charters and the history of the
Bretton Woods conference indicate that the duty to
behave apolitically extends to individual directors as
well as to the banks as institutions. This individual
duty is further supported by analogy to the Internation-
al Court of Justice CI.C.J.) opinion regarding permis-
sible criteria for admission to the United Nations.
1. Charter Provisions
Article IV, section 10 of the I.B.R.D. charter
CI.B.R.D. IV.10) and analogous provisions in the char-
ters of thie other banks declare that the banks and
their officers must not interfere in the political af-
fairs of any member; their decisions must not be in-
fluenced by the political character of the member or
members concerned; only economic considerations shall
be relevant to their decisions; and these considera-
tions shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve
the purposes stated in the charters.114 For these
provisions to have much practical effect, they must
apply to the decisions of the directors of the banks.
Except for the residual powers of the boards of
governors, the directors are vested with supreme
authority in the banks, They are responsible for the
"conduct of the general operations" of the banks.115
All loans are subject to their approval. Therefore,
their decisions on loan proposals directly determine
the decisions of the banks, as institutions, on loan
proposals.
Other provisions of the charters also refer to
the power of "the Bank" to take particular actions.
These provisions would have little practical effect if
they did not also apply to the directors and governors
who decree what actions "the Bank" will take.l16
114. See note 57 supra.
115. See notes 61, 62 supra.
116. For example, I.B.R.D., art. III, §5(a), note 6
supraj says, "The Bank shall impose no conditions that the proceeds
of a loan shall be spent in the territories of any particular mem-
ber or members." Since the directors are responsible for loan
decisions, this provision would have little force unless it applied
to the directors. I.B.R.D., art. VI, §5Cb) indicates even more
clearly that the decisions of the directors and governors constitute
decisions of the bank: "The Bank may suspend permanently its
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The General Counsel of the World Bank has himself
stated that the term "the Bank," as -used in I.B.R.1J.
IV.10, refers "to the Institution as such and to its
organs, the Board of Governors and the Executive
Directors. ,,117
Given that the boards of directors cannot base
their decisions on political considerations, it would
make little sense if individual directors could do so.
To prohibit a board from deciding on the basis of poli-
tical considerations, while permitting individual board
members to base their decisions on political concerns,
would inject indeterminacy into the actions of individ-
ual directors. It would make little sense to say that
a director who votes on the basis of non-economic con-
siderations violates the charters if his vote prevails,
but does not violate the charters if his vote does not
prevail.
Undoubtedly, the fact that directors are bound by
provisions such as I.B.R.D. IV.10 means they do not
have unfettered freedom to represent or advocate the
views of the countries that appointed or elected them.
However, the charters themselves indicate that the
role of the directors is to be distinguished from the
role of national representatives.
First, the charters are very careful never to
refer to the directors as the "representatives" of
countries. The charters even avoid declaring that the
directors "cast the votes" of member countries and
instead specify that each director casts either "the
number or votes allotted ... to the member appointing
him" or "the number of votes which counted towards his
election."ll 8 In contrast, some of the charters do
refer to the governors as representatives of the mem-
116. CContinued)
operations in respect of new loans and guarantees bt vote of a
majori ty of the Governors ... " (emphasis supplied). The same
conclusion arises from I.AD.B., art, IV, §9(a) which says,
"All decisions of the Bank concerning the operations of the
Fund [for Special Operations] shall Be adopted By a two-thirds
majority of the total voting power of the member countries."
117. 21 'U.N. GAOR, C.4 (1645th mtg.) 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.
4/SR.1645 (1966) (provisional summary record) reprinted in 6
Int'l Legal 'Materials 150, 152 (1967).
118. J. Gold, supra note 49, at 99-100, 212. See generaZZy
note 65 supra (texts of relevant charters).
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bers that appointed them,1 1 9 and the Charter of the Uni-
ted Nations refers to "representatives" of members in both
the General Assembly and the Security Council.
1 2 0
Second, the division of functions between the boards
of governors and the directors leaves the boards of
governors with responsibility for decisions which are
likely to involve political issues. These include deci-
sions which concern the admission of new members, in-
creases or reductions in bank resources, the suspension
of members, final interpretations of the charters, and
arrangements to cooperate with other international organi-
zations. 1 2 1 It has been suggested that this allocation of
authority was designed to preserve the non-political role
of the directors.12
Third, except in the case of the Af.D.F., directors
are reimbursed on the basis of full-time service by the
banks themselves, and not by member countries.
1 2 3
2. The Decision of the International Court of Justice
in the United Nations Membership Case
A close analogy exists between bank directors opposing
loans for political reasons and the issues addressed by
the International Court of Justice in its decision concern-
ing the conditions of admission of a state to membership
in the United Nations.1 2 4 In that decision, the Interna-
119. See note 6 supra: I.D.A., art. VI, §2(b); A.D.B., art. 27,
para. 1, art. 30, para. l(b).
120. U. N. Charter art. 9, para. 2 & art. 23, para. 3.
121. See note 62 supra.
122. This suggestion was made by Henry Bitterman, who helped
formulate United States proposals for the I.M.F. and I.B.R.D. and who
participated in the Bretton Woods Conference. See Bitterman, supra
note 107, at 79.
123. By-laws of the I.B.R.D., §14(e); by-laws of the I.F.C., §12(f)
(July 24, 1956); by-laws of the I.D.A., §4(c) (Nov. 8, 1960). But see
note 6 supra: Af.D.F., art. 27, para. 8, (Af.D.F. shall not pay com-
pensation to directors). The 1979 House Investigative Report, supra
note 72, at 135-48, discusses and lists the salaries of the directors
and other personnel in the World Bank, I.A.DR., and A.D.B.
124. Advisory Opinion on Conditions of Admission of a State to
Membership in the United Nations, 11948] I.C.J. 56.
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national Court of Justice ruled that a member of the United
Nations cannot, in either the Security Council or the
General Assembly, make its affirmative vote on the admis-
sion of a state to the United Nations subject to conditions
not expressly set forth in article 4 of the United Nations
Charter.1 2 5 Just as the Court reasoned that article 4 is,
by its terms, an exhaustive enumeration of the conditions
for admission of states to the United Nations,1 26 it is
logical to assume that the declarations of purposes and
functions which appear in the banks' charters are exhaustive
statements of the conditions for supporting proposed loans.
This assumption is bolstered by the explicit requirement
that the banks be guided in all their decisions by the pur-
poses and functions set forth in their charters. 12 7 There-
fore, by analogy to the I.C.J. decision, a member of the
banks could not condition its support for loans upon factors
irrelevant to the banks' purposes and functions.
Moreover, the United Nations Charter does not contain
any negative commands that United Nations members must not
condition their support for the admission of other states
on particular considerations. The International Court of
125. Id, at 65. U.N. Charter art. 4 says:
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all
other peace-loving states which accept the obligations
contained in the present Charter and, in the judgement
of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out
these obligations.
2. The admission of any such state to membership
in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of
the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the
Security Council.
The particular condition under consideration in the United Nations
Membership Case was a requirement that other states be admitted to mem-
bership together with the first state to apply at a given time. In
1947, the Soviet Union demanded that the admission of Italy, Finland,
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria be voted on en bZoc. When this demand
was refused, it vetoed the applications of Italy and Finland, and
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania failed to receive the seven votes neces-
sary to constitute a recommendation for membership by the Security
Council. L. Sohn, Cases on United Nations Law 57 (2d ed, 1967).
126. [19481 I.C.J. 62-63.
127. See note 55 supra (relevant articles of charters).
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Justice had to deduce that a United Nations member could
not subject an affirmative vote on the admission of one
state to the condition that other states also be admitted
to membership.1 28 In contrast, the charters of the banks
specifically forbid decisions based upon non-economic con-
siderations. 129
Finally, the International Court of Justice, in the
United Nations Membership Case, did address the question
whether action impermissible for a collective body might
nevertheless be permissible for individual members of
that body. Just as the language of I.B.R.D. IV.10 forbids
only the I.B.R.D., and not individual directors, from
making decisions based upon non-economic considerations,
so article 4, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter
speaks only of membership decisions "effected by a deci-
sion of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of
the Security Council."1 3 0 Nevertheless, the International
Court of Justice quite logically held that individual mem-
bers of the United Nations could not condition their votes
on criteria not specified in article 4, paragraph 1.
3. The Early History of the Bretton Woods Agreements--
the Birth of the I.B.R.D. as an Apoliti eal Functional
Institution
Henry Bitterman has written that I.B.R.D. IV.10 was
"probably intended principally as reassurance to the
USSR" to encourage it to participate in the I.B.R.D.131
However, a more comprehensive analysis suggests that its
genesis lies in the interplay between British and United
States conceptions of what should be the post-war inter-
national economic order. 13 2
Harry Dexter White of the United States Treasury
Department and British economist John Maynard Keynes were
the principal architects of the Bretton Woods institutions,
128. [1948] I.C.J. 65.
129. See note 57 supra (prohibitions on political activity).
130. See note 125 supra.
131. Bitterman, supra note 107, at 79; see also E. Mason &
R. Asher, supra note 18, at 11 n. 1, 27.
132. See Yokata, The Non-Political Character of the World Bank,
20 Japanese Ann. of Int'l L. 39, 42-48 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Yokata].
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the I.B.R.D. and I.M.F.133 By September, 1941, Keynes had
drafted a plan for an "international Clearing Union" whose
purpose and scope of operations were similar to those of
the future I.M.F.1 3 4  By the end of 1941, White had drafted
a plan for a "United and Associated Nations Stabilization
Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction of the United and Asso-
ciated Nations.,,1 3 5  Both White and Keynes believed in the
importance of international economic cooperation,13 6 and
both plans made it clear that the proposed institutions
were to be international in outlook.137 However, White's
133. The Bretton Woods Agreement Act authorized US. membership
in the I.B.R.D. and I.M.F. The I.M.F. and I.B.R.D. were conceived
during World War II as two complementary institutions on which would
be based a new post-war monetary and financial world order. The main
purpose of the I.M.F. is to help member countries to cope with rela-
tively short-term balance of payments problems, while the purpose of
the I.B.R.D. is to attack the structural problems which prevent mem-
bers from fulfilling their productive potentials. The charters of
these institutions are together known as the Bretton Woods agreements--
after Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, where the charters were drafted in
their final form by an international conference of representatives
from forty-four countries. The United States Congress jointly approved
the charters in the Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1945. See generazy
A. van Dormael, Bretton Woods--Birth of a Monetary System (1978) [here-
inafter cited as A. van Dormael]; R. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy
xvii-xxxiii, 71-95, 106-21, 257-68 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as R. Gardner]; R. Oliver, supra note 76, at 109-250.
134. A. van Dormael, supra note 133, at 29-39. This plan is
reprinted in The New Economics--Keynes' Influence on Theory and Public
Policy 323-41 (S. Harris ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as The New Econo-
mics].
135. A. van Dormael, supra note 133, at 42-47; R. Gardner, supra
note 133, at 74 n. 1. All portions of one of the drafts of this plan
that pertain to the Bank are reprinted in R. Oliver, supra note 78, at
279-322. Note that as reprinted, the title of the plan is "Sug '
gested Plan for a United Nations Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Re-
construction and Development of the United and Associated Nations"
[emphasis supplied], suggesting that there are differing versions of
White's "earliest" plan. See note 138 infra.
136. A. van Dormael, supra note 133, at 34, 45; R. Gardner,
supra note 133, at 74-77, 268; R. Harrod, The Life of John Maynard
Keynes 427 et seq. (1951) [hereinafter cited as R. Harrod]; The New
Economics, supra note 134, at 321-22; R. Oliver, supra note 76, at 125;
R. Oliver, Early Plans, supra note 19, at 5, 44-45.
137. Compare White's plan, R. Oliver, note 76 supra, at 270-84,
320-21, with Keynes' plan, The New Economics, supra note 134, at 324-25.
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original plan apparently contained no analog to present-
day I.B.R.D. IV. 10,138 whereas Keynes' plan declared
that:
(a) the Clearing Union should be able to
accommodate countries with different principles
of government and different economic policies,
(b) its operations should involve the
least possible interference with national
policies, and
(c) its management "must be genuinely inter-
national without preponderant power of veto or
enforcement to any country or group; and the
rights and privileges of the smaller countries
must be safeguarded."139
By August 1942, White knew about Keynes' plan, and
after that time he made several revisions of his own
plan.14 0 In November 1943, the United States Treasury
Department issued its first official proposal for a
"Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United
and Associated Nations." It was based upon White's
revised plan and it was to be the basis for negotiations
at the Bretton Woods conference.141 It contained the
following forerunner of I.B.R.D. iV.10:
The Bank and its officers shall scrupulously
avoid interference in the political affairs of
any member country. This provision shall not
limit the right of an officer of the Bank to
participate in the political life of his own
country.
138. This statement is not beyond dispute. R. Gardner, supra
note 133, at 74, 80, says, with respect to the Fund and Bank proposed
in White's earliest draft, "They were to become genuine institutions
of international government, serving the needs of their members with-
out regard to national political considerations." (emphasis supplied).
However, nowhere in the draft reprinted in R. Oliver, supra note 76,
do any provisions sustaining this statement appear, and Oliver has
reprinted all provisions pertaining to the proposed bank. Oliver
himself is ambiguous aboat the origins of I.B.R.D. IV.10, as one can
see from id. at 142.
139. The New Economics, supra note 134, at 324-25.
140. R. Oliver, supra note 76, at 136-42, 148-55.
141. Id.
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The Bank shall not be influenced in its
decisions with respect to application for loans
by the political character of the government of
the country requesting a loan.1 4 2
Sometime before the beginning of the Bretton Woods confer-
ence, the sentence "Only economic considerations shall be
relevant to the Bank's decisions" was added to the end of
this provision. The fact that the British substantially
rewrote article IV of the I.B.R.D. charter before the
conference suggests that this might have been their
doing. 143
Keynes, therefore, may have been the main source of
inspiration for I.B.R.D. IV.10. It is true that in his
work concerning the Bretton Woods institutions, Keynes was
motivated largely by the desire to secure easy credit
terms for Britain and to preserve Britain's freedom to
pursue expansionary post-war economic policies. He real-
ized that the I.M.F., acting at the behest of the world's
main creditor country, the United States, might demand
that Britain take corrective measures to reduce its bal-
ance of payments deficits, that it maintain stable cur-
rency values, and that it rapidly dismantle its foreign
exchange restrictions. 1 44 Yet there was another side to
Keynes. Not only did he, by World War II, believe in the
necessity of international economic cooperation, but he
also believed that the Bretton Woods institutions would
suffer if they were -manipulated for political reasons. 1 4 5
To the extent that I.B.R.D. IV.10 reflects Keynes'
ideas, it probably reflects this last mentioned belief
that the I.B.R.D. should be a completely apolitical insti-
tution.1 4 6 Certainly, as the following examples indicate,
142. United States Treasury Department, Preliminary Draft Out-
line of a Proposal for a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of
the United and Associated Nations, art. IV, §19, at 10 (Nov. 24, 1943).
143. R. Oliver, supra note 76, at 174-81.
144. R. Gardner, supra note 133, at 74-95, 110-21, 264.
145. A. van Dormael, supra note 133, at 296, 302; R. Gardner,
supra note 133, at 80-82, 265-67; R. Harrod, supra note 136, at 638.
146. One reason to suppose that the main purpose of I.B.R.D.
IV.10 is not to prevent the I.B.R.D. from demanding that member
countries take corrective (i.e., often deflationary) measures to put
their economic houses in order as a pre-condition for receiving assis-
tance is that there is no analog to I.B.R.D. IV.10 in the I.M.F. charter.
However, analogously to the I.B.R,D. charter, there is a provision
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that was the way in which the U.S. Treasury Department,
as well as White and other United States officials who
took part in the creation of the I.M.F. and I.B.R.D.,
viewed I.B.R.D. IV.10 and the Bretton Woods Agreements.
In February 1944, the United States Treasury issued
a booklet entitled Questions and Answers on the Bank for
146. (Continued)
which says that the Managing Director, officers, and staff of the
I.M.F. owe their duty entirely to the I.M.F., and that members must
respect this duty and refrain from attempts to influence them in the
conduct of this duty. Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, art. XIV, §4(c), Dec. 27, 1945, 6.0. Stat.
1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 40, as amended, May 31, 1968, 20
U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748, as amended, Apr. 1, 1978, pursuant to
Board of Governors Resolution No. 29010. If I.B.R.D. IV.10 were in-
tended merely to preserve member countries' economic sovereignty, one
would expect to find an analogous provision in the I.M.F. charter,
since it was generally thought that an institution like the I.M.F.
had a greater potential than a development bank for limiting what had
traditionally been regarded as sovereign nations' economic freedom of
action. Prior to the Bretton Woods conference, Keynes managed to
remove most of the provisions from White's plan for a stabilization
fund that would have enabled the fund to insist that member countries
take corrective measures to reduce their balance of payments problems
and would have required members rapidly to dismantle their foreign ex-
change restrictions. R. Gardner, supra note 133, at 121. If Keynes
had managed to get this far and if the primary purpose of I.B.R.D.
IV.10 were merely to protect economic sovereignty, it would seem he
would have gone all the way and included an analog to I.B.R.D. IV.10
in the I.M.F. charter.
On the other hand, if one assumes that the primary purpose of
I.B.R.D. IV.10 is to isolate the I.B.R.D. from political considera-
tions, in general, then there is a good reason why it is more important
to have such a provision in the charter of the I.B.R.D. than in the
charter of the I.M.F. In the I.M.F., each member's drawing rights
depend upon its quota, i.e.., the amount of its contributions to the
Fund. In the I.B.R.D. and the other banks there is no relation between
the amount of loans a member might receive and the level of its con-
tributions or capital subscriptions. R. Oliver, supra note 76, at 187.
Therefore, the managements of the banks have much more discretion in
deciding which countries should receive loans than the management of
the I.M.F. has over -members' drawing rights.
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Reconstruction and Development1 4 7 to explain the general
principles behind White's November, 1943 draft. In response
to the question, "Will it be possible for the Bank to avoid
making loans based chiefly on political considerations?,"the
booklet answered in part:
The Bank is designed to be an international
economic agency to facilitate productive inter-
national investment without regard to political
considerations. In deciding on loan applications,
the Bank is not to be influenced by the political
character of the country requesting the credits.
This provision is part of the general requirement
that the Bank shall scrupulously avoid inter-
ference in the political affairs of member
countries.
The international character of the Bank is
also a protection against loans made for political
purposes .... The Bank itself can have no policy
outside the purely financial sphere.
This does not imply that international loans
for political purposes have no justification.
Obviously, there will be instances when loans may
properly be made to aid a friendly government.
But such loans should not be made with the aid
or encouragement of the Bank which is exclusively
concerned with international investment for produc-
tive purposes, nor should such loans be made with
funds provided by private investors. Where loans
must be made for political purposes, the funds
should be provided by the interested government or
governments, without requiring either the Bank or
private investors to assume the risks inherent in
such loans. 14 8
147. United States Treasury Department, Questions and Answers
on the Bank for Reconstruction and Development 75-77 (1944) (emphasis
supplied) (on file with Yale Studies in World Public Order) [herein-




The booklet also said that the Bank would apply no tests
to a proposed loan beyond determining whether it would be
productive and could be repaid.149
In his testimony before the House of Representatives
on the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, White noted the basic
division of functions between the United Nations and the
Bretton Woods institutions. The Dumbarton Oaks proposal,
which formed the basis of the United Nations Charter, was
to handle chiefly the political aspects of world problems,
while the Bretton Woods agreements were to take care of a
substantial portion of the economic apsects of world prob-
lems. Together, they would "constitute two pillars to
support the edifice of world peace and world prosperity.t'1 50
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, the chairman of
the Bretton Woods conference, echoed this apolitical concep-
tion of the Bretton Woods institutions when he said before
the Senate:
Rebuilding and restoring the devastated coun-
tries, as I see it, is primarily a job for their
domestic industries, Certain basic essentials,
however, will have to be imported. These include
transportation equipment and industrial and
agricultural machinery. If private investors
abroad will not lend the necessary capital on
reasonable terms, countries will be forced to
seek help in other ways. Foreign loans might
then be arranged on a political basis. This could
only mean the rule of power politics in interna-
tional economic relations.
I repeat, the businessmen of this country do
not want to do business that way. The extension
of these tactics must mean in the end the domina-
tion of international trade and investment by
governments. This country has the greatest interest
in seeing that international trade and investment
are determined by economic and not by political
considerations. 151
In commenting on the Bretton Woods negotiations them-
selves, Morgenthau said:
149. R. Oliver, supra note 76, at 162.
150. Bretton Woods Agreements Act: Hearings on H.R. 2211 Before
the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 79th Cong., ist Sess. 106 (1945).
151. 1945 Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 7.
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The thought was that [member countries]
could come to a world bank or a world fund and
get their financial needs-taken care of without
having to sell their political souls.... These
are to be financial institutions run by financial
people, financial experts, and the needs in a
financial way of a country are to be taken care
of wholly independent of the political connection. 152
As to the United States view that the directors should
play an apolitical role, consider first the following ex-
change between Secretary Morgenthau and Senator Taft:
Senator Taft. Do you think when a board
[of directors] is set up, composed of the great
nations and the small nations of the world,
they are not going to be affected by politics
about the making of a loan to a nation?
Mr. Morgenthau. I am repeating myself on
this, but the institutions will carry out their
work as far as it is humanly possible to do it--
and it depends on the people running it--on a
strictly business basis.1 3
Later, at the inaugural meeting of the I.M.F. and
I.B.R.D. in Savannah, White declared:
[T]he most important thing [is] that the Executive
Directors should be devoting their thoughts and
time to studying world problems rather than the
problems of their individual countries.... They
should not consider themselves as representing
only their individual governments, and they
should not come with instructions from their
governments. They should consider themselves
as members of an international organization.1 54
While the United States government recognized the prac-
tical difficulty of preventing individual directors from
making decisions on the basis of political considerations,
it nevertheless considered that it would be undesirable
for any country to try to exert political influence over
the I.B.R.D.'s activities through its director.
152. Id. at 14.
153. Id. at 15.
154. A. van Dormael, supra note 133, at 297.
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So far as concerns individual member countries,
they do undoubtedly have important international
political interests. However, it would be quite
difficult for any member country to utilize the
Bank for the purpose of furthering its political
interests. Bach member is represented on the
Board by one [Director], and no country can cast
more than 25 percent of the aggregate votes ...
It remains true that the possibility always
exists that pressure will be exerted to induce the
Bank to extend foreign credits because they are
politically necessary. So far as possible, the
draft proposal is designed to minimize such in-
fluences in international lending. We recognize,
however, that no set of rules will of itself com-
pletely eliminate political considerations and
that proper limitation of the Bank's activities
depends ultimately on the character of the men
responsible for its operationsi 55
It is true that these statements reflect an idealistic
vision of the post-war world. However, this fact should
not deprive the history of the Bretton Woods agreements of
relevance to today's issues. To the extent that the in-
tent of the drafters of the Bretton Woods agreements means
anything in interpreting-these agreements, this history
indicates that the drafters intended the I.M.F. and I.B.R.D.
to function as apolitical institutions, and, moreover, in-
tended that members should not use their directors to ma-
nipulate these institutions for their own political ends.
Furthermore, it appears that these same drafters, especial-
ly Keynes and White, believed that, regardless of political
climate, these institutions could accomplish their work
more effectively, better preserve their integrity, and
bring about a greater net benefit for the world, if the
persons running them concentrated on economic issues to the
exclusion of political ones.1 5 6
Finally, despite the unforeseen political conflicts
that have arisen, the boards of directors have, to a large
extent, developed the "world, objective outlook ' 15 7 that
155. Questions and Answers, supra note 147, at 76, 77.
156. See R. Gardner, supra note 133, at xxxviii-xl.
157. R. Gardner, supra note 133, at xxix.
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Keynes had felt it was so important for them to have. As
a former president of the World Bank testified before the
United States Senate:
... I think what impressed me more than anything
else in my experience on the World Bank is the
objectivity of the different people there. We
had a board of 18 directors, and I think each
director certainly felt an obligation to his
country but he also felt a very strong obligation
to the Bank, and I think that the decisions made
were objective decisions and fair decisions.158
D. Congressional Instructions to U.S. Directors Violate
Directorst Duty to the Banks
While the directors of the banks do play a role as
representatives of member countries, that role should not
entail looking beyond economic and financial concerns.
Nothing in the legislation establishing the National Advi-
sory Council on International Monetary and Fiscal Problems
contravenes a limitation of this nature. In fact, the
legislative history of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act
indicates that Congress recognized the existence of just
such a restriction.
Admittedly, it is occasionally difficult to distinguish
between economic and political considerations. Neverthe-
less, the charters of the banks and the drafting history
of the first of these charters strongly indicate that the
actions of the directors must conform to the purposes of
the banks and to the apolitical character of the banks.
Member countries and their directors must, therefore, re-
spect the banks' limited sphere of activity, and recognize
the need to shield the banks from pressures that might in-
terfere with the achievement of their development purposes.
For these reasons, the directors of the banks must deem
themselves bound by both the requirement that the banks be
guided in all their decisions by the development purposes
158. Asian Development Bank Act: Hearing on H.R. 12563 Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1966)
(testimony of Mr. Black).
[VOL. 6
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS
set forth in their charters, and by the obligations con-
tained in I.B.R.D. IV.10 and analogous provisions in the
other banks' charters. Therefore, the recent requirements
that United States directors oppose all loans to certain
countries and all loans for the production of certain agri-
cultural commodities violate the charters of the banks,
the international obligations of the United States under
those charters, and the basic conceptions of the drafters
of those charters.
IV. Human Rights
Given that directors cannot base their decisions in
the banks on political considerations, can they, neverthe-
less, refuse to support proposed loans on the ground that
the governments of the proposed recipient countries fail
to respect the basic human rights of their subjects? Legis-
lation passed in 1977 provides that United States directors
in the banks are authorized and instructed to oppose any
extension of assistance to any country whose government
"engage[s] in ... a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human
rights, such as torture or cruel, inhumane, or
degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged
detention without charges, or other flagrant
denial to life, liberty, and the security of
person ... unless such assistance is directed
specifically to programs which serve the basic
human needs of the citizens of such country."1 59
There are three possible rationales for permitting the
banks to take human rights conditions into account in formu-
lating development plans and in making specific decisions
on loans. First, the concept of economic development can
be expanded to include the protection of human rights.
Second, the growing body of international law relating to
human rights places an affirmative obligation on the banks
and their members to act to improve human rights conditions,
notwithstanding the charters of the banks.160 Third, to the
159. 22 U.S.C.A. § 262d(a), (f).
160. This rationale is set forth in Mamorstein, World Bank Power
to Consider Human Rights Factors in Loan Decisions. 13 J. Int'l L. &
Econ. 113 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Mamorstein],
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extent that human rights violations create instability or
government mismanagement which jeopardizes the success of
development projects, such violations have direct economic
consequences which the banks should consider. Similarly,
if human rights violations in a particular country indi-
cate a serious misappropriation of scarce national re-
sources, such misappropriation should be considered in
deciding whether to extend assistance to that country.
This paper will examine each of these rationales in
light of the purposes and functions of the banks, the
charters of the banks, and other sources of international
law.
A. The First Rationale; The Purposes of the Banks Encom-
pass the Protection of Human Rights
There are two problems with this first rationale,
First, it is hard to read the language of the charters so
broadly. In general, the statements of purposes and func-
tions contained in the charters speak only of economic
development.1 61 Only the charters of the Af.D.B. and
Af.D.F. and the amended charter of the I.A.D.B. speak about
contributing to the process of "social development. "16 2
Both the charters of the IB.R.D. and I,D.A. speak of "rais-
ing the standard of living" in member countries, but only
in the context of those institutions promoting economic
development and increasing productivity in order to raise
standards of living. 163 Thus, except perhaps in cases of
the I.A.D,B., Af.D.B., and Af.D.F,, a literal reading of
the banks' charters leaves little room to include the pro,
tection of human rights within the stated purposes and
functions of the banks--unless one is prepared to argue
that the protection of human rights, in and of itself, is
one aspect of economic development.
Second, while the banks themselves have broadened their
conception of what constitutes economic development, they
have stopped short of saying or implying that promoting
economic development encompasses the protection of human
rights.
161. See note 55 supra.
162. See note 6 supra: I.A.D.B,, art. I (as amended, 1976);
Af.D.B., art. 1; Af.D.F., art. 2.
163. See note 6 supra: I.B,RD., art. I, subpara. iii; I.D.A.,
art. I,
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In 1972 and 1973, Robert McNamara, then President of
the World Bank, spelled out a new orientation in develop-
ment policy for the World Bank. In the future, the World
Bank would place relatively less emphasis on large scale
capital infra-structure projects and relatively more empha-
sis on projects to benefit the poor16 4 directly, to in-
crease the productive potential of the poor, and to try to
narrow the gap between rich and poor in developing coun-
tries. 1 6 5 This change would mean a greater emphasis on
projects and programs to increase public services for the
poor, to make available-to them appropriate technologies,
to increase their access to credit, and to increase their
levels of employment. It would also encourage and assist
governments to carry out institutional reforms to redis-
tribute economic power in favor of the poor, to shift pat-
terns of public expenditures to benefit the poorest seg-
ments of developing countries' populations, and to elimi-
nate distortions in the prices of land, labor, and capital,
which often make these items more expensive for the poor
than for the rich.
1 6 6
These new policies are now being implemented.1 6 7  In
1979, a special congressional investigation of the banks
concluded that the banks
have made an earnest effort to direct an
increasingly larger share of their lending
towards reaching the poorest people in
164. Considered in most developing countries to be the poorest
40 percent of the population.
165. R. McNamara, Annual Address in International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, 1972 Annual Meeting of the Board of Gover-
nors: Summary Proceedings 16, 21-28 [hereinafter cited as 1972 Annual
Meeting of the Board of Governors, and similarly for all other years];
R. McNamara, Annual Address in 1973 Annual Meeting of the Board of
Governors 12, 20-33.
166. Id.; 1978 Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, supra
note 165, at 12, 30-31. The World Bank has advocated internal reforms
relating to land, tax, credit, and banking policies.
167. Farnsworth, World Bank Loans Not Just Money, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 7, 1977, §4, at 4, col. 3; Interview with Robert McNamara,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1978, at E3, col. 1; Nossiter, World Bank Shifts
Focus to Local Projects, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1980, at D 1, col, 2;
Hovey, World Bank Plan Focuses on Health Care for Poor, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 23, 1980, 91, at 4, col. 1; R. McNamara, Annual Address in
1978 Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, supra note 165, at 12,
30-31.
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developing countries and improving their
productivity and income levels,16 8
The World Bank, however, has refused to venture into the
domain of what it calls "civil rights," in which it in-
cludes rights relating to the protection of the human
person.169 The World Bank gives three reasons for this
policy: C1) the World Bank was founded to provide economic
assistance, and the charters of its component institutions
specifically provide that they shall not take account of
considerations other than economic considerations; (2) the
World Bank is not competent to deal with non-economic is-
sues, since it lacks persons who are skilled in dealing
with such issues; and (3) member governments have not
agreed upon any standards to apply in this field.1
70
There may, however, be a fourth reason implicit in
these statements. The banks have already embarked on a
policy which raises issues with potentially sensitive
political ramifications. 17 1 The more the banks emphasize
such goals as narrowing the gap between rich and poor and
bringing about institutional reforms, the more they will
require the cooperation of the countries receiving develop-
ment assistance. As long as authorities in these countries
believe that the banks are acting in the interest of eco-
nomic development and on the basis of objective economic
principles, there exists a common basis for agreement and
cooperation between the banks and these countries. 172 How-
ever, if authorities in these countries perceive that the
banks are going beyond economic considerations in deciding
what projects to fund and what conditions to attach to such
funding, then the common basis for agreement and coopera-
tion will be undermined. As the banks' operations become
more ambitious and the banks assume more responsibility in
total international development effort, their1 73 actions
168. 1979 House Investigative Report, supra note 72, at 164 et seq.
169. Transcript of Rohert S. McNamara Speaking to a Press Seminar
in the World Bank, at 11 (May 10? 1978) (on file with YaLe Studies in Plorld
Pub lic Order). Interview with Robert McNamara, NY. Times, Apr. 2, 1978, at
E3, col. 1.
170. Id.
171. See notes 183-86 supra; The Economist (London), International
Banking: A Survey 21 (Mar. 22, 1980).
172. R. Oliver, Early Plans, supra note 19, at 44-45; E. Mason
& R. Asher, supra note 18, at 431-34.
173. See Farnsworth, World Bank Loans Not Just Money, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 7, 1977, §4, at 4, col. 1 (noting that "the World Bank has be-
come the largest source of technological and financial assistance to
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will more frequently have political ramifications. To pre-
vent political disputes from interfering with their develop-
ment goals, the banks need to try even more scrupulously to
preserve this basis of common agreement--both among member
countries and the banks and the individual members of the
banks' staffs.1 74
The banks have emphasized that among the most basic of
human rights is the right to minimal levels of nutrition,
health, and education; and that they are more sensitive to
these rights and are doing more to advance them than are
any other institutions. 175 Both the banks and many develop-
ed member countries are concerned that if the banks are
obligated to pursue human rights as well as development
goals, there is great danger that the effectiveness of the
banks' present work will be sacrificed in return for doubt-
ful gains in the sphere of human rights.1 76
B. The Second Rationale; Derogations from Bank Charters
Are Permissible
The second possible rationale for allowing the banks
to take human rights conditions into account is that obli-
gations under international human rights law authorize dero-
gations from the charters of the banks.
1. Jurisdictional Limitations Imposed by the Charters of
the Banks and the United Nations Charter
Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter
declares:
173. (Continued)
the developing nations."); The Economist (London), International Bank-
ing: A Survey 22 (Mar. 22, 1980) (noting recent decision by member
countries to double World Bank's capital stock to enable it to double
its lending).
174. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 352 (statement
by Rep. McHugh noting how difficult it is even in our bilateral aid
programs to determine which countries should be singled out for cut-
backs in aid because of their human rights policies).
175. See notes 169, 173 supra.
176. 1979 House Investigative Report, supra note 72, at 184-85;
1979 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 660-65, 697-701. Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Human Rights and
Foreign Policy 109.
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Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to inter-
vene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state ...,
but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII.177
This provision has been the primary obstacle to the United
Nations' asserting its competence to protect human rights. 1 7 8
However, a number of United Nations resolutions and deci-
sions by the International Court of Justice, in the process
of expanding the competence of the United Nations to act to
protect human rights, have pushed back the jurisdictional
limits imposed by this provision, For example, Resolution
1235 of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
(1967)179 authorizes the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights
in appropriate cases, to make a thorough study
of situations which reveal a consistent pattern
of violations of human rights, as exemplified
by the policy of apartheid as practised in the
Republic of South Africa and the Territory of
South West Africa .., and racial discrimination
as practised notably in Southern Rhodesia, and
report, with recommendations thereon, to the
Economic and Social Council.1 8 0
177. See note 120 supra.
178 See Ermacora, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction
(Article 2, §7 of the Charter), in 124 Acadgmie de Droit International.
Recueil des Cours 371 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ermacora].
179. E.S.C. Res. 1235, 42 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 19, U.N.
Doc. E/4393 (1967).
180. Id. (emphasis supplied). E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR,
Supp. (No. 1A) 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.l (1970), sets forth procedures
for handling reports of such violations and making studies and recom-
mendations based on such reports. Many Soviet bloc and Third-World
members of the Council objected to the procedures as originally pro-
posed on the ground that they "represented interference in the domestic
affairs of sovereign states," Commission on Human Rights: Report on
the 26th Sess., 48 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 5) 33-35, U.N. Doc. E/4816,
E/CN.4/1039 (1970). Consequently, Resolution 1503, in its final form,
specifies that investigations into alleged human rights abuses can be
undertaken by an ad hoc committee established by the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights (a) only with the consent of the state con-
cerned and only so long as it is conducted in constant cooperation with
that state and under conditions determined in agreement with it, and




This resolution was the first step towards establishing
permanent -procedures to investigate all types of serious
human rights violations.181 Moreover, it is probably this
resolution which allowed at least one commentator to as-
sert that gross violations or consistent patterns of vio-
lations of human rights no longer lie solely within the
jurisdiction of individual countries. 18 2
Another example of such jurisdictional expansion is
provided by dictum in the Case Concerning the Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. C1970)183 There
the International Court of Justice noted that obligations
derived "from the principles and rules concerning the
basic rights of the human person, including protection
from slavery and racial discrimination,"' are "obligations
towards the international community as a whole," and "[b]y
their view of the importance of Ithese] rights," wrote the
Court, tall States can be held to have a legal interest in
their protection...•"184
However, the fact that serious human rights violations
may now be a matter of international concern does not give
the banks the competence to champion human rights. Arti-
cle 2, paragraph 7, of the 'United Nations Charter is in-
tended to protect the national sovereignty of members of
the United Nations. 18 5 The principle of national sovereign-
ty and the limitations which it places upon United Nations
jurisdiction inform the debates leading up to the passage
of Economic and Social Council Resolution 1235 and the
Barcelona Traction decision.1 86  Neither the principle of
national sovereignty nor the limited jurisdiction of the
United Nations has anything to do with those provisions of
the banks' charters that declare that the development pur-
poses of the banks shall guide all their decisions and that
such decisions shall be based solely upon economic considera-
tions. 1 87 These provisions define the limited competence
181. Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and the HIwnan
Rights Clauses of the Charter, 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 337, 344 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Schwelb].
182. Ermacora, supra note 178, at 436.
183. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Ltd. (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v. Spain) Second Phase
[1970] I.C.J. 4.
184. Id. at 33.
185. See Ermacora, supra note 178.
186. See notes 179, 180, 183, 184 supra.
187. See notes 55, 57 supra.
198o0]
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
of the banks, Thus, the fact that the principle of
national sovereignty no longer is a complete shield
against international reaction to harsh human rights
policies does not overcome these provisions.
Even leaving aside the issue of the competence of
the banks to protect human rights, I.BR.D. IV.10 still
prohibits the banks from interfering in the political
affairs of members. 1 88 It makes no distinction between
internal and external political affairs. In contrast,
United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution
1235189 and the quoted passages from Barcelona Traction 19 0
hinge upon the distinction between domestic and non-
domestic jurisdiction.
Finally, by agreement between the World Bank and
the United Nations, these two institutions have con-
siderable independence from each other.1 91 Therefore,
decisions which relate to the United Nations Charter
and resolutions which concern the competence of United
Nations institutions should not be extrapolated facile,
ly to the banks.
2. International Obligations to Protect Human Rights
that May Permit Derogations from the Charters of
the Banks
Even though the banks are not competent to take
human rights considerations into account on their own
initiative, merely for the sake of promoting human
rights, there may exist obligations on the part of the
188. See note 55 supra,
189. See notes 179-80 supra.
190. See notes 183-84 supra.
191. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Nov. 15, 1947, 16
U.N.T.S. 346 [hereinafter cited as United Nations--I.B.R.D. Agree-
ment];
Agreement Between the United Nations and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Acting for and on Behalf
of the International Finance Corporation) on Relationship Between
the United Nations and the International Finance Corporation, Eeb.
20, 1957, 265 U.N.T.S. 314 [hereinafter cited as United Nations--
I.F.C. Agreement];
Agreement Between the United Nations and the International
Development Association, Mar. 27, 1961, 394 U.N.T.S. 222 [herein-
after cited as United Nations--I.D.A. Agreement]. See also text
accompanying notes 217,19 infra.
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international community or among the members of a
regional organization such as the Council of Europe or
the Organization of American States to respond to vio-
lations of human rights in particular countries or ter-
ritories in a manner which involves consideration of
measures to limit economic assistance to those particu-
lar countries or territories. The existence of such an
obligation should be a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the banks' consideration of human rights
issues in the course of making loan decisions. Any
obligation to consider human rights must be balanced
against the banks' conflicting and primary duty to base
loan decisions solely on economic considerations. In
balancing the two obligations, the banks must consider:
(a) whether the obligation to protect human rights
specifically involves the limitation of economic assis-
tance or whether it seeks improvements in human rights
conditions by other means (i.e., if the obligation does
not concern economic sanctions or other limitations on
economic assistance, it probably does not concern the
banks at all);
(b) the force of the obligation under internation-
al law--in particular, whether it is derived from
(i) a binding decision of a competent
international organ, such as the United Nations
Security Council92 or the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe 19 3 or a
decision of a competent international tribunal,
such as the International Court of Justice,1 9 4
the European Court of Human Rights1 94 or the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights; 19 6
192. U.N. Charter art. 25.
193. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 32, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
194. U.N. Charter art. 94.
195. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 48, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
196. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969
(now in force), arts. 62, 63, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, at 1-21
(O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/SER.A/16).
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Cii) a resolution by a competent inter-
national organ with only recommendatory
authority, such as the United Nations
General Assembly1 97 or Economic and Social
Council1 9 8 or the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights;1
9 9
(iii) the writings of publicists; or
(iv) the pronouncements of individual
governments, but only to the extent that
they reflect the sentiments of the inter-
national community; 200
and finally;
(c) the way in which an obligation to protect hu-
man rights, if applied to the banks, would affect the
economic progress of needy persons in developing cQun-
tries, a goal to which both the banks and the United
Nations are dedicated. 201
The most authoritative guide to establishing such
an obligation and balancing the various factors mention-
ed above appears in the International Court of Justice's
197. U.N. Charter arts. 10-17.
198. U.N. Charter arts. 62-66.
199. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
(now in force though United States has not yet ratified it), art. 41,
O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, at 1-21 (O.A.S. Official Records,
OEA/SER.A/16).
200. One possible example of obligations--although they are
obligations with questionable international force--is President
Carter's March, 1977, address to the-United Nations General Assembly,
in which he said:
All the Signatories of the U.N. Charter have pledged
themselves to observe and to respect basic human
rights. Thus, no member of the United Nations can
claim that misfreatment of its citizens is solely
its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its
responsibilities to review and to speak when torture
or unwarranted deprivation of freedom occurs in any
part of the world.
76 Dep't State Bull. 332 (1977). See Oscar Schachter's analysis of
President Carter's position in Schachter, International Law Implica-
tions of U.S. Human Rights Policy, 24 N. Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 63
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Schachter].
201. U.N. Charter arts. 1, 55, 56, the relevant portions of




advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences for States
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970).202 In Namibia the main issue
before the Court were the validity of Resolution 276
20 3
and what measures were required of South Africa and
the rest of the international community as a consequence
of this resolution.
The Court found, sua sponte, that a policy of
apartheid, such as that applied by South Africa in Nami-
bia, constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights
and thus a per se violation of the purposes -and princi-
ples of the United Nations Charter. 04  But in establish-
ing the international community's obligation to respond
to the situation in Namibia, the Court did not rely on
its own assessment of South Africa's policies. Instead,
it made that obligation dependent upon the prior Securi-
ty Council resolution. The Court affirmed the validity
of Security Council Resolution 276,205 and declared that
once a competent organ of the United Nations has made a
binding determination that a situation is illegal, there
exists a duty, especially upon Members of the United
Nations, to bring that situation to an end. 20 6 The
Court then declared:
The precise determination of the acts
permitted or allowed--what measures are
available and practicable, which of them
should be selected, what scope they should
be given and by whom they should
202. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Se-
curity Council Resolution 276, [1971] I.C.J. 16.
203. Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) declared that
"the continued presence of the South African Authorities in Namibia
is illegal and that consequently all acts taken by the Government
of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termi-
nation of the Mandate are illegal and invalid," and called "upon
all States, particularly those which have economic and other inter-
ests in Namibia, to refrain from any dealings with the Government
of South Africa which are inconsistent with [this declaration of
illegality];" 25 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 1, 2, U.N. Doc
S/INF/25 (1970).
204. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 57, para. 131.
205. Id. at 53, para. 115.
206. Id. at 54, para. 117.
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be applied--is a matter which lies within
the competence of the appropriate political
organs of the United Nations- acting within
their authority under the Charter. Thus it
is for the Security Council to determine any
further measures consequent upon the decisions
already taken by it on the question of
Namibia. 207
This passage may leave open the possibility that the
General Assembly has some authority to determine what
measures should be taken in response to human rights
violations. It leaves little doubt, however, that the
political organs of the United Nations have exclusive
competence to determine what measures the international
community should or must take in the way of economic
sanctions against a country which violates human rights.
In particular, this passage strongly implies that indi-
vidual countries have no basis under the law of the
United Nations to effect such international sanctions
unilaterally.
The Court qualified the obligation upon countries
to "abstain from entering into economic and other forms
of relationship or dealings with South Africa on behalf
of or concerning Namibi which may entrench its author-
ity over the Territory" by saying, "In general, the
non-recognition of South Africa's administration of the
Territory should not result in depriving the people of
Namibia of any advantages derived from international co-
operation."2 09 The Court concluded this section of its
opinion with the declaration, "As to the general conse-
quences resulting from the illegal presence of South
Africa in Namibia, all States should bear in mind that
the injured entity is a people which must look to the
international community for assistance... ' 2 1 0 This last
point finds support in the United Nations Charter, which
accords to economic development goals a priority at
least equal to that accorded human rights goals.2 1 1
207. Id. at 55, para. 120 (emphasis supplied).
208. Id. at 55-56, paras. 124, 125 (emphasis supplied).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 56, para. 127 (emphasis supplied).
211. See U.N. Charter arts. 1, 55, 56, Article 1 states that
one of the purposes of the United Nations is "[t]o achieve interna-
tional cooperation in solving international problems of an economic,
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and en-
couraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinctions as to race, sex language, or religion."
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The careful reasoning by which the International
Court of Justice arrived at its conclusion that the in-
ternational community has an obligation to limit economic
relations with South Africa suggests a general procedure
for establishing similar obligations upon the interna-
tional community in response to serious violations of
human rights. Initially, a competent international organ
must find that human rights violations in a particular
country or territory are so serious that the internation-
al community has an obligation to act to put an end to
these violations. A competent international organ must
also decide what specific measures are to be taken to try
to end these violations. Even more importantly, Namibia
declares--fully supported by the United Nations Charter--
that such measures should not deprive the people of the
country or territory concerned of the benefits of inter-
national economic oooperation. Namibia concerned the
policy of apartheid, a category of human rights viola-
tions which the international community, by clear consen-
sus, believes to warrant its concern and response.
2 1 2
This fact strongly suggests that the limitations which
Namibia placed on economic sanctions against South Afri-
ca apply equally to international obligations to impose
economic sanctions in response to other types of human
rights violations.
Therefore, given that obligations that involve eco-
nomic sanctions must be established by competent inter-
national organs and that such obligations must not de-
prive the people of a developing country of the benefits
of international development assistance, it appears un-
likely that there are any current obligations under in-
ternational law, with the possible exceptions of obliga-
tions to curtail economic relations which help sustain
South Africa's apartheid policies and its control over
Namibia, that can overcome the obligation upon the banks
211. (Continued)
Article 55 declares that the U.N. shall promote: "a) higher standards
of living, full employment and social progress and development" and
"c) universal respect for, and observance of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all . . ." In Article 56, members pledge them-
selves to take "joint and separate action" to achieve the goala set
out in Article 55.
212. Schwelb, supra note 181 at 341-46, 348-50; see aZso
Ermacora, supra note 178, at 427 (U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3, Art
13, para. 1(b); art 55(c), prohibitions on discrimination).
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to take only economic considerations into account.2 1 3 In
other words, it is unlikely that the banks are now per-
mitted to take into account human rights considerations,
per se, in making loan decisions.
3. International Obligations to Protect Human Rights
that Can Compel Derogations from the Charters
of the Banks.
Part II, above, showed that directors are governed
by the obligation that the banks take only economic con-
siderations into account in making decisions. Therefore,
as long as there is no other obligation under interna-
tional law which can counterbalance this obligation,
directors cannot oppose loans solely on the basis of hu-
man rights considerations. Once there exists such a
countervailing obligation, however, the banks may take
human rights considerations into account for their own
sake, and directors may oppose loans directly on the
basis of human rights concerns.
The existence of such an obligation does not, how-
ever, necessarily mean that it is desirable either for
directors to oppose loans for human rights reasons, or
that the banks be compelled to take human rights consid-
erations into account. The issue hinges on the danger
of politicizing the banks2 1 4 and on the danger that
limitations on development assistance will do more harm
than good.
Whether the banks are compelled to take into ac-
count human rights considerations is determined, in
large part, by the agreement defining the relationship
between the United Nations and the I.B.R.D. 21 5 This
213. This conclusion assumes that there are no such obliga-
tions under current statutory (or customary) international law. In
particular, it assumes that instruments such as the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948),
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967)
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, though the United States has not
yet ratified it) do not create such obligations. See Ermacora,
supra note 178, at 427-30 (Universal Declaration of Human Rights not
legally binding).
214. See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
215. United Nations--I.B.R.D. Agreement, supra note 191.
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agreement, entered into by the United Nations and the
I.B.R.D. in 1947 pursuant to articles 51 and 63 and arti-
cle V, section 8, respectively, of their charters, was
later supplemented by agreements between the United
Nations and the I.F.C. and the United Nations and the
I.D.A.21 6 The pertinent article of the United Nations--
I.B.R.D. agreement states:
1. The United Nations and the Bank shall
consult together and exchange views on matters
of mutual interest.
2. Neither organization, nor any of their
subsidiary bodies, will present any formal
recommendations to the other without reason-
able prior consultation with regard thereto.
Any formal recommendations made by either
organization after such consultation will be
considered as soon as possible by the appro-
priate organ of the other.
3. The United Nations recognizes that the
action to be taken by the Bank on any loan is
a matter to be determined by the independent
exercise of the Bank's own judgment in accord-
ance with the Bank's Articles of Agreement.
The United Nations recognizes, therefore, that
it would be sound policy to refrain from making
recommendations to the Bank with respect to
terms or conditions of financing by the Bank.
The Bank recognizes that the United Nations
and its organs may appropriately make recom-
mendations with respect to the technical as-
pects of reconstruction or development plants
[sic], programmes or projects. 217
Article V, section 8 of the I.B.R.D. charter pro-
vides:
Ca) The Bank, within the terms of this
Agreement, shall cooperate with any general
international organization and with public
international organizations having specialized
responsibilities in related fields. Any
arrangements for such cooperation which would
216. United Nations-I.F.C. Agreement, supra note 191;
United Nations--l.D.A. Agreement, supra note 191.
217. United Nations--I.B.R.D. Agreement, supra note 191,
art. IV.
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involve a modif-icat-Con of any provision of
tts- Agreement may be effected only after
amendment to this Agreement under Article
VI.
Cb) In making decisions on applications
for loans or guarantees relating to matters
directly within the competence of any in-
ternational organization of the types speci-
fied in the preceding paragraph and parti-
cipated primarily by members of the Bank,
the Bank shall give consideration to the
views and recommendations of such organization.
21 8
These two articles, read together, affirm the independence
of the I.B.R.D., and emphasize the bank's obligation to
make loan decisions solely on the basis of economic con-
siderations. 19 The only provision of the agreement
which even alludes to the possibility of derogations
from the charter of the r.B.R.D. is article VI, section
1, which states:
The Bank takes note of the obligations
assumed, under paragraph 2 of Article 48
of the United Nations Charter, by such of
its members as are also Members of the
United Nations, to carry out the decisions
of the Security Council through their
action in the appropriate specialized
agencies of which they are members, and
will, in the conduct of its activities,
have due regard for decisions of the
Security Council under Articles 41 and 42
of the United Nations Charter.
2 20
In 1967, during discussions in the United Nations
General Assembly over I.B.R.D. loans to Portugal and
South Africa, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations
remarked that "there was nothing in the United Nations
Charter which was mandatory for the Bank. Article 48
stated that decisions of the Security Council should be
'carried out by the Members of the United Nations direct-
ly and through their action in the appropriate interna-
tional agencies of which they are members.,,,221 Thus
218. I.B.R.D., art. V, § 8 (emphasis supplied),
219. Bleicher, UN v. IBRD: A Dilemma of Functtonalism, 24
Int'l Organizations 31, 35-42; Yokata, supra note 132, at 55-59.
220. United Nations--I.B.R.D. Agreement, supra note 191.
221. 21 U.N. GAOR, C. 4 (1653d mtg.) 11, U.N. Doc. A/C.4,SR,
1653 (1966) (testimony of Mr. Stavropoulos).
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at least as far as obligations to the United Nations are
concerned, members of the banks are compelled to deviate
from the bank charters only to comply with United Nations
Security Council decisions for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.
C. The Third Rationale: In Some Cases, Human Rights
Considerations Are Relevant to Economic Considera-
tions
In making loan and other assistance decisions, the
banks may consider human rights factors that legitimately
implicate economic decision-making criteria. Banks
should take care, however, to limit their reliance on
this rationale to situations in which the relation be-
tween human rights and economic factors is reasonably
clear and direct.
1. Banks May Consider Human Rights under this Rationale
Violations of human rights can have economic conse-
quences which the banks may take into account. Human
rights abuses can cause, or be symptoms of, governmental
instability and arbitrariness, or poor management of
economic affairs--all of which can threaten the success
of development projects and programs. Human rights
abuses, such as discrimination against or intimidation
of certain segments of a country's population, may pre-
vent the benefits of development projects and programs
from accruing to the very people who most need assis-
tance.222
In addition, any cost-benefit analysis in which
the main criterion for success is an increase in the
well-being of needy persons must contemplate the possible
negative effects of development projects and programs.
If development assistance merely permits a government to
bolster repressive policies, the banks should take this
factor into account when making loan decisions. Consid-
erations such as these are legitimate economic ones,
since economics, at its most basic, involved the satis-
faction of human needs and wants at the lowest possible
cost. It is consistent with such a definition of
economics to include in any cost-benefit analysis an
examination of the broader effects of a proposed project
on the welfare of those whom it is intended to benefit.
222. Schachter, supra riote 200, at 86.
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2. Limits on the Admissibility of Human Rights
Considerations under this Rationale
It is important to distinguish this third rationale
for permitting the banks to take account of human rights
conditions from the first rationale. The latter contem-
plates that the purposes and functions of the banks im-
plicitly include the protection of human rights. By con-
trast, the third rationale holds that the banks may not
regard the protection of human rights, for its own sake,
as one of their purposes. Instead, the banks may take
human rights considerations into account only to assess
the net effect of individual development projects and
programs on human welfare. In other words, there must
be a close connection between those human rights consid-
erations which are taken into account and the particular
project or program planned or carried out.
In particular, access to development assistance
should not be used as leverage to bring about improve-
ments in human rights conditions, so long as that assis-
tance is likely to bring about a net increase in the wel-
fare of needy persons in developing countries. Such
coercive use of development assistance is impermissible
and inadvisable. The concept of "economic considerations"
would be stretched too far if it included opportunities
to increase human welfare via political changes exacted
by the banks' assistance policies; 22 3 considerations of
this nature would involve undeniably political elements.
Moreover, coercive use of development assistance would
certainly be regarded as interference in the political
affairs of members of the banks, and therefore prohibi-
ted by I.B.R.D. IV.10 and its analogs.2 24
Coercive use of development assistance would intro-
duce a politically charged issue into the banks' cost-
benefit calculations, thus politicizing the banks and
jeopardizing their effectiveness as development institu-
tions. 2 2 5 Even if the banks were willing to take this
risk, it would be extremely difficult to calculate
whether the potential gains in human rights would exceed
the costs of withholding aid from needy persons.
223. See note 57 supra.
224. Id.
225. See note 5 supra. See also 125 Cong. Rec. 117299 (Waily
ed. Sept. 5, 1922)(referring to Marmorstein, supra note 160, at 135).
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3. Deciding When Human Rights Considerations Have
Economic Implications
Decisions as to when human rights violations raise
economic considerations that the banks should take into
account must be made by the banks themselves on a case-
by-case basis. Political bodies such as national legis-
latures do not have the expertise or the impartiality to
enable them objectively to determine the overall costs
and benefits of individual development projects and pro-
grams. Furthermore, the charters of the banks declare
that authority over the operations of the banks is vested
in their boards of governors and directors. 22 6 Finally,
the charter of the T.B.R.D. declares that member coun-
tries shall deal with the I.B.R.D. only through their
treasuries, central banks, or similar fiscal agencies. 22 7
Therefore, national legislatures may not insist that
human rights violations in particular countries have
economic consequences which compel the banks to limit
assistance to those countries. Similarly, the provision
in the Agreement Between the United Nations and the
I.B.R.D. which states, "it would be sound policy [for the
United Nations] to refrain from making recommendations to
the Bank with respect to particular loans...,,228 implies
that similar demands by international political bodies
should not be binding on the banks.
E. The Basic Human Needs Exception in United 6tates
Legislation
As mentioned above, 22 9 United States legislation
requires American directors in the banks to oppose loans
and any other assistance to any country whose government
engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights, "unless such
assistance is directed specifically to programs which
serve the basic human needs of the citizens of such coun-
try.''2 30 Does the exception contained in this legisla-
tion make the legislation acceptable under the third
rationale presented above?
226. See notes 61, 62 supra.
227. See note 6 supra: I.B.R.D., art. III, §2.
228. See United Nations--I.B.R.D. Agreement, supra note 191,
at art. IV, §3.
229. See text accompanying note 159 s-upra.
230. Mamorstein, supra note 160 Cemphasis suppliedl.
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One official of the Jnited States Treasury Depart-
ment has provided the following description of the manner
in which the United States government has implemented the
"basic human needs" provision:
Given the increasing economic diversity
which characterizes the developing world; it
it clear that the basic needs concept must
relate to the various stages of the develop
ment process and patterns of income distri-
bution. It must be applied within the con-
text of each recipient country's unique
economic, cultural and social circumstances.
While it is not feasible to attempt an
explicit definition of basic human needs
which could be uniformly applied to all
developing countries, one result of the
application of the basic human needs concept
to United States policy in the multilateral
development banks is that the United States
has tended to oppose loans to countries
with serious human rights problems when the
loans are for large capital or infrastruc-
ture projects. 23 1
An economic cost-benefit analysis would probably
not distinguish between capital and infrastructure pro-
jects on the one hand, and projects directly serving
basic human needs on the other, so long as both types of
projects result in net increases in the welfare of needy
persons in the not-too-distant future. Recently, devel-
opment planners have emphasized that large capital and
infrastructure projects form an essential part of any
balanced development program designed to help poor per-
sons in developing countries. 23 2 It would therefore
appear that, even given the basic human needs exception,
current legislation will sometimes require United States
directors to vote in ways which cannot be justified on
the basis of economic considerations.
Overview and Conclusions
The analysis in the latter half of this Article has
often focused more on the World Bank than on the other
231. Statement by Brian Crowe-, Jnited States Treasury Depart-
ment, Apr. 28, 1980 (on file with. Yale Studies in World PZd,.ic Order).
232. Nossiter, World Bank Shifts Focus to Local Projects- N.Y.
Times (late city ed.), Jan. 31, 1980, at D 1, col. 2.
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multilateral development banks, largely because of the
greater availability of information concerning the World
Bank. But since the World Bank is the oldest, largest,
and most influential 23 3 of the banks, and since the
charters and operations of all the banks are similar,
the conclusions concerning the World Bank are likely to
apply to the other banks. The intended focus through-
out this Article has been on the multilateral development
banks as a group rather than on one particular bank. It
is important that the current disputes concerning ear-
marking, the status of the directors, and human rights
not be seen merely as a clash between two institutions--
the World Bank and Congress or the World Bank and any
other executive or legislative branch of a national
government. These disputes implicate the central theme
of this Article, the importance of insuring the apoliti-
cal character of all the multilateral development banks
amidst the divergent interests of their member countries.
This concern does not arise from a belief that the
banks and multilateral development assistance are impor-
tant in and of themselves. It arises instead from a
recognition that the multilateral banks provide an alter-
native and, in some respects, more effective means of
encouraging desirable development in developing coun-
tries; that effective development will redound to the
benefit of all the present members of the banks; and
that the effectiveness of multilateral development assis-
tance depends to a great extent upon the multilateral
banks' functioning as apolitically as possible. The
charters of the banks, together with the legislative
history of the I.B.R.D. charter, clearly affirm and re-
quire all members to recognize the apolitical and
strictly development-oriented character of the banks.
Members may not, therefore, use their participation in
the banks to further their own political objectives in
conflict with the banks' development objectives.
The charters of the banks generally prohibit na-
tions from earmarking subscriptions. Members of the
I.B.R.D. have the right to veto the use of their curren-
cies which constitute the paid-in portion of their sub-
scriptions to the I.B.R.D. However, a member country's
veto of the use of its currency on political grounds
would be contrary to the original intentions behind the
currency-veto power provision, would be without prece-
dent in the 35-year history of the I.B.R.D., and would
233. See Table (Appendix), lines 1-4.
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conflict with other provisions of the I.B.R.D. charter.
In none of the other institutions do developed member
countries have veto power over the use of their curren-
cies.
While directors may represent the interests of the
countries which appointed or elected them with respect
to economic and financial matters, their actions must
conform to the development purposes of the banks and to
the requirement that the banks function as apolitical
institutions. Members may not instruct their directors
to oppose loans to particular countries or projects for
political reasons or for reasons which are unrelated to
the development purposes of the banks. At the same
time, the banks and their directors may take into
account human rights considerations in making loan deci-
sions. They may do so, however, only to the extent
that such considerations have economic implications
which are relevant to the banks' purposes and functions.
Whether particular violations of human rights have such
implications must be decided by the banks themselves on
a case-by-case basis.
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